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RETHINKING THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
by 
Chiara Giorgetti 
The acceptance of the individual as a subject of international law has 
been gradual and asymmetrical. Individuals have become international 
law subjects in their own rights in some international legal areas, in-
cluding human rights and international criminal law. This affords in-
dividuals substantive rights and obligations, as well as procedural 
rights. In most legal areas, however, individuals acquired substantive 
rights, but not direct procedural rights. In those instances, individuals 
need the filter of a nationality to enforce their claim and remedy in inter-
national proceedings. This Article criticizes the nationality-based ap-
proach and argues that there are better and alternative ways to provide 
procedural rights for claims arising from individual substantive rights 
under international law. A new approach could address some of the 
asymmetries of the present system and reconcile the difference between the-
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INTRODUCTION 
Westphalian sovereignty created a world based on co-existing sover-
eign States. In terms of legal theory, State sovereignty was based on inde-
pendence and equality between States: by and large, each State was sov-
ereign within its own territory, and other States could not interfere in 
another State’s domestic affairs. International law was the space of States, 
not individuals. The idea of sovereignty “carried extraordinary power 
within the shared consciousness of society.”1 Functionally, this view re-
 
1 Stéphane Beaulac, The Westphalian Model in Defining International Law: 
Challenging the Myth, 8 AUSTL. J. LEGAL HIST. 181, 186, 210–11 (2004) (“the orthodoxy 
according to which the Peace of Westphalia recognised and applied for the first time 
the idea of sovereignty and hence constitutes a paradigm shift in the development of 
the present state system is historically unfounded and, in effect, is a myth. It was 
argued that 1648 constitutes no more than one instance where distinct separate 
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sulted in a system set up for States as the sole subjects of international 
law, while individuals were the subjects of the State and its internal laws.2 
As explained in this Article, for a variety of reasons and in a variety of 
ways, the doctrinal thinking of the position of the individual has substan-
tially evolved and, especially since World War II, there has been a pro-
gressive recognition of the role played by the individual in international 
law. Functionally, however, international law is still set up as an inter-
State system, where the individual has a limited place to exercise her 
rights.  
While the individual’s position in specific areas of international law 
has been the subject of study before, this Article focuses on something 
different: it explores the discrepancy and asynchronous development of 
international law, and the effect this has had on the capacity of the indi-
vidual to act in international law. The approach is rooted in a historical 
analysis of the progressive emancipation of the individual in the interna-
tional legal system. This Article also has a larger goal: it offers a systemat-
ic approach to the role of the individual in international law and explains 
why it is time to free the individual in international law and allow her to 
access the international legal system in a more expansive and creative 
manner. 
Part I of this Article explains the individual’s position in internation-
al law and how this position has evolved in the post-World War II era. 
Part II focuses on how the link between the State and the individual, ex-
pressed through nationality, has become constrictive, fallacious, and inef-
ficient. Part III builds on the first two and develops alternatives to using 
nationality to access international law claims. These alternatives are based 
on a functional approach and on providing multiple bases for jurisdic-
tion for an individual’s international claim.3 To conclude, the application 
of these alternatives is analyzed in practice to demonstrate how individu-
als will benefit, especially for claims related to common goods, such as 
those arising from climate change, and other environmental-related 
 
polities pursued their continuing quest for more authority over their territory 
through greater autonomy.”). 
2 Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20, 20–28 
(1948) (stating that “the importance and dignity of being the first of several attempts 
to establish something resembling world unity on the basis of states exercising 
untrammeled sovereignty over certain territories and subordinated to no earthly 
authority” is traditionally attributed to the Peace of Westphalia. “Westphalia, for 
better or worse, marks the end of an epoch and the opening of another. It represents 
the majestic portal which leads from the old into the new world.”). Anzilotti remarks 
that Westphalia is considered as the starting point of historical development of 
international law. DIONISIO ANZILOTTI, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 5 (1st ed. 
1929) (in French in the original, Westphalia “considérés avec raison comme le point 
de départ du développement historique du droit international actuel.”). 
3 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in 
Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21 (1998). 
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damages. This proposal is also responsive to the increasing public and 
political demand for new approaches in Investor-State dispute settlement 
(ISDS) procedures. 
I.  THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EVOLVING 
STORY 
International law is, as all legal systems are, based on a agreement, 
whereupon a group of individuals coalesce to create a recognized enti-
ty—the State—that represents their interests, creates and enforces a legal 
system, and acts on their behalf vis-à-vis other States.4 Individuals are a 
necessary component of States. States are created by, and are made up of, 
individuals.5 However, States went on to become the main subjects of in-
ternational law. Traditionally, there has been little space for individuals 
in international law, yet actions by individuals are increasingly percolat-
ing into the empty spaces left in the structure of the international com-
munity. Indeed, the individual has pierced the veil that has kept her sep-
arate from the State and has acquired rights and obligations by herself. 
This Section explores and explains this evolution. 
The increasing recognition of the individual as a subject of interna-
tional law represents an important development in the post-World War II 
era. Prior to this development, the State was the main subject of interna-
tional law; individuals were not recognized as independent subjects in in-
ternational law. Individuals were only recognized vicariously as interna-
tional subjects, as nationals of a State. Historically, individuals had no 
rights and obligations under international law; they were subjects of do-
mestic law. States were subjects of international law. Thus, individual rep-
resentation in international adjudication was done through diplomatic 
means whereby a State espoused the claims of one of its nationals in in-
ter-State proceedings. The individual had no direct standing in interna-
tional proceedings.6 
The post-World War II period brought about significant develop-
ments in the recognition of individuals in the international legal system. 
Doctrinally, international law has adopted a more flexible approach to 
accommodate different international legal subjects with different rights 
 
4 Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (Lori Damrosch & Sean Murphy eds., 6th ed. 2014) (“The 
‘persons’ constituting international society are not individual human beings but 
political entities, ‘states,’ and the society is an inter-state system, a system of states.”). 
5 The Montevideo Convention requires a permanent population as one of the 
four necessary elements that constitutes a State. Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.  
6 See 1 LASSA F. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 362 (2d ed. 1912) 
(“Since the Law of Nations is a law between States only and exclusively, States only 
and exclusively are subjects of the Law of Nations.”). 
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and obligations.7 The individual has become an increasingly recognized 
subject of international law in many areas. She has acquired many human 
rights, and has the obligation to respect international criminal law. This 
does not mean that the individual is on par with the State as a subject of 
international law, however.  
The increasing relevance of the individual in the international legal 
system has not been uniform. A clear example in which this difference 
has manifested is the divide between substantive and procedural rights 
for individuals in international law.8 The ability to enforce substantive 
rights procedurally gives the individual immediate access to remedies 
under international law. But being recognized as a subject of interna-
tional law gives the individual both substantive and procedural interna-
tional legal rights in only a few instances. For example, this is sometimes 
the case in human rights proceedings.  
In many other instances, procedural rights have not followed sub-
stantive rights. At times, rights are vested to the State, and the State has 
the right to require other States to grant rights to individuals.9 In some 
areas, States may still exercise their diplomatic powers to represent an 
individual’s claims against a State. In these situations, the claim becomes 
the State’s, and any remedies are awarded to the State. In other areas, the 
individual must possess a certain nationality to access certain internation-
al courts and tribunals. In matters of international investment law, for 
example, the individual rights of the investor cannot be directly exercised 
without an overarching treaty binding the individual to a State. The indi-
vidual can only bring a claim if she possesses a certain nationality. This is 
because most rights are enshrined in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
whereby individuals’ rights are framed as rights deriving from the State.10 
Hence, because the link between the individual and international law is 
established through nationality, an individual must hold the correct na-
tionality to access international law remedies; this also means that indi-
viduals who do not possess the right nationality lack access to interna-
tional protection. This is the case for stateless people, but nationality has 
 
7 Simone Gorski, Individuals in International Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 15 (2013) (“Doctrinally, this change in State practice 
was legally accommodated by showing a more flexible approach towards the concept 
of subjects of international law.”). 
8 ANNE PETERS, BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (Jonathan Huston trans., 2016) (calling this a “Decoupling 
[of] Substantive and Procedural Individual Rights”). 
9 Christian Walter, Subjects of International Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 18 (2007) (the individual “has internationally been 
granted rights and is made subject to obligations . . . .”). 
10 Luke Eric Peterson & Kevin R. Gray, International Human Rights in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and in Investment Treaty Arbitration, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 
8–9 (Apr. 2003), https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_int_human_rights_ 
bits.pdf. 
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received renewed attention also because of dual-nationals and individuals 
whose States have not ratified the specific international treaty.11 In these 
instances, nationality has become an obstacle that impedes the individu-
al’s direct access to international law remedies.  
This Article highlights this fallacy and argues that the individual 
should be recognized as such in international law. Certainly, this would 
result in a radical change of certain features of international law. Indeed, 
rejecting nationality as a base for international claims may seem like a 
bold proposition. Yet, doing so would reflect an updated doctrinal un-
derstanding and an appreciation of a post-Westphalian world—one in 
which the individual is not inevitably subordinated to the State, and one 
that would also result in a more consistent understanding of individuals’ 
substantive and procedural rights. 
Appreciating the fundamental shift that occurred after World War II 
in the position of the individual in international law is key to understand-
ing the argument of this Article, which suggests alternative bases for indi-
vidual claims based in international law and separated from claims of the 
State. Indeed, at its core, this Article challenges the existing rationale 
that subordinates the individual to the State in international law. Indi-
viduals need not be filtered by States when accessing international law. 
States and individuals can have widely different interests, and a State may 
not always have an interest in pursuing what is best for the individual. 
Freeing individuals from States when accessing international law, and ac-
cepting the argument advanced in this Article, would be more than a 
mere academic exercise, indeed it could have repercussions in many are-
as of international law—we could envisage a completely different system 
of international subjects. 
As an initial step in pursuance of this goal, the section below ex-
plains the aforementioned historical shift and its significance. It then fo-
cuses on two important areas in which recognizing individuals as subjects 
of international law is particularly advanced: human rights and interna-
tional criminal law. Finally, it explores other areas of international law in 
which the transformation of the role of the individual is still transitional 
and not “completed,” so that the individual enjoys some rights, but can 
seldom exercise them directly in the international sphere.  
A. The Individual in International Law: From Objects to Legal Personality 
The classic view of international law provides that international law is 
the law that applies between nations—it was, literally, inter-national. Only 
States had rights and duties under international law.12 Indeed, 
 
11 Ruth Donner, Dual Nationality in International Law, 47 HUNG. J. LEGAL STUD. 15, 
16 (2006). 
12 Walter, supra note 9, ¶ 15 (stating that before it changed in the last 50 years, 
“[u]nder traditional international law, individuals were under the exclusive control of 
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Under the Westphalian System, it was the States that were the 
dominant players in the international system and the doctrine of 
State sovereignty as developed by Bodin and Hobbes made it 
impossible for the international system to perceive the individu-
als of which the State was composed as actors and right-holders 
within the system.13 
In the Westphalian system, individuals were not subjects of international 
law and had no international legal rights. It was left to domestic law to 
regulate individuals and groups.14  
Writing in 1912, Lassa Oppenheim, one of the recognized fathers of 
international law, treated individuals as “objects of international law”15 
whose importance was “just as great as that of territory.”16 He claimed 
that individuals are never subjects of international law because “the Law 
of Nations is a law between States only and exclusively, States only and 
exclusively are subjects of the Law of Nations.”17 Rights and duties that 
individuals may have in conformity with international law derive from 
domestic law only.18 
The application of this exclusive sovereignty principle is clearly re-
flected in practice and in a seminal decision by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ), the precursor of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). In the now classic SS Lotus Case, the PCIJ asserts: 
International law governs relations between independent States. 
The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from 
their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages gen-
erally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in 
order to regulate the relations between these co-existing inde-
 
States.”). See also Gorski, supra note 7, ¶ 11 (“A theory linked to the influence of 
natural law was that individuals bear rights and duties. This theory, however, fell into 
disuse with the growing importance of the State. . . . To say it with Hobbes’ Leviathan, 
the bellum omnium contra omens—the war of all against all—was supposed to be the 
natural state that could only be averted by a strong centre.”). 
13 Gorski, supra note 7, ¶ 11. 
14 Citing the first (1905) edition of Oppenheim’s Treatise, Parlett explains 
“[s]ubjects of rights and duties under international law were states ‘solely and 
exclusively.’ International law was a law ‘for the international conduct of States, and 
not of their citizens.’ Individuals and groups were not subjects of international law 
and had no rights as such under international law.” KATE PARLETT, THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 
(2010).  
15 OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 290 (“But what is the real position of individuals in 
International Law, if they are not subjects thereof? The answer can only be that they 
are objects of the Law of Nations.”). 
16 Id. § 288 (noting that this chapter follows the chapter on territory, in the 
section dedicated to objects of international law). 
17 Id. § 289. 
18 Id. 
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pendent communities or with a view to the achievement of 
common aims.19 
A major and fundamental shift occurred in the post-World War II period: 
while States continued to play a preeminent role in international law, in-
dividuals also became increasingly more relevant in international law.20 
Thus, by the time the most recent edition of Oppenheim’s treatise 
(edited by Sir Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts) was published in 
1992,21 the individual had acquired importance in international law and 
enjoyed certain rights. The authors write: 
[T]he quality of individuals (and private companies and other 
legal persons) as subjects of international law is apparent from 
the fact that, in certain spheres, they enter into direct legal rela-
tionships on an international plane with states and have, as such, 
rights and duties flowing directly from international law. It is no 
longer possible, as a matter of positive law, to regard states as the 
only subjects of international law, and there is an increasing dis-
position to treat individuals, within a limited sphere, as subjects 
of international law.22 
The 8th edition of another classic treatise by Ian Brownlie—edited by 
now-ICJ Judge James Crawford in 2012—sees the individual purely as a 
subject of international law.23 Malcolm Shaw also writes that “modern 
practice does demonstrate that individuals have become increasingly 
recognised as participants and subjects of international law.”24  
In the post-World War II world, States continue to be the major and 
leading actors in international law.25 They continue to be the principal 
subjects of international law. International law is primarily made up of 
 
19 Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 at 
18 (Sept. 7). 
20 Walter, supra note 9, ¶¶ 15–18 (stating that “[t]he position of international law 
with respect to individuals changed considerably in the last 50 years” and “the 
individual today has acquired a legally relevant position in international law.”). Note 
that individuals are not the only new subjects of international law: international 
organizations and to a different extent non-governmental organizations and 
multinational corporations also play new and different roles. This article focuses on 
individuals only. 
21 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th 
ed. 2008) (noting that the section pertaining to the individual is still in Part 2, 
dedicated to the objects of international law). 
22 Id. § 375. 
23 JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 
(8th ed. 2012).  
24 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (8th ed. 2017). 
25 Walter, supra note 9, ¶ 18 (“[M]any norms of international law are, for reasons 
of their content, only applicable to States.”). 
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rules that are based on the express or tacit consent of the States.26 How-
ever, while States remain the primary subjects of international law, they 
are not the only subjects. Individuals have gradually become subjects of 
international law in their own rights. They enjoy certain rights, and are 
beginning to have certain obligations under international law.27 
This shift in thinking about the individual is well reflected in the ju-
risprudence of the PCJI and the ICJ. The PCIJ case Jurisdiction of the Courts 
of Danzig exemplifies the tension brought about by this doctrinal shift in 
thinking.28 The 1928 case related to an agreement between Poland and 
the then-Free City of Danzig in regard to railway employees. The Court 
concluded that the officials had a right of action against the Polish Rail-
ways Administration in domestic courts, as opposed to international 
courts, for the recovery of pecuniary claims.29 In an oft-cited passage, the 
PCIJ held that it could: 
[B]e readily admitted that, according to a well established prin-
ciple of international law, . . . an international agreement, can-
not, as such, create direct rights and obligations for private indi-
viduals.30  
Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig is often cited as a paramount example of 
the inability of individuals to hold international rights.  
However, a more recent and accurate reading, well-supported by 
Kate Parlett’s work, highlights the tension and ambiguity of the wording 
of the PCIJ’s decision. Her work points out that, in fact, the Court may 
have authored the first authoritative statement that an individual could 
acquire direct rights by treaty.31 Indeed, PCIJ President Dionisio Anzilotti 
held that the Court had not concluded that international agreements 
could contain rights for individuals, but only that treaty parties could 
create individual rights by implementing legislation.32 Others disagreed. 
 
26 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59, https://www.icj-
cij.org/en/statute. 
27 Walter, supra note 9, ¶ 16 (“International law has undergone an evolutionary 
development in this respect. It is undisputed that international treaties may create 
individual rights and obligations.”). 
28 Beaulac, supra note 1, at 210–11 (“[T]he orthodoxy according to which the 
Peace of Westphalia recognised and applied for the first time the idea of sovereignty 
and hence constitutes a paradigm shift in the development of the present state system 
is historically unfounded and, in effect, is a myth. It was argued that 1648 constitutes 
no more than one instance where distinct separate polities pursued their continuing 
quest for more authority over their territory through greater autonomy.”). 
29 Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) 
No. 15, ¶ 48 (Mar. 3, 1928). 
30 Id. ¶ 37. 
31 Kate Parlett, The PCIJ’s Opinion in Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig: Individual 
Rights under Treaties, 10 J. HIST. INT’L L. 119, 119 (2008).  
32 See id. at 121; see also PETERS, supra note 8, at 44.  
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Hersch Lauterpacht, for example, reasoned that if treaty parties so in-
tended, and the treaty provisions were clear enough, then treaties could 
create individual rights which were immediately applicable.33 Lauterpacht 
called the PCIJ’s judgment a “revolutionary pronouncement.”34 In 1928, 
when the decision was issued, however, the world was not ready to em-
brace such a revolution in doctrine. Many years had to pass before that 
extent of the PCIJ’s pronouncement was fully understood.35 
Sensibilities had changed by the end of World War II. In 1949, the 
ICJ was asked to advise whether the United Nations, as an international 
organization, had the capacity to bring an international claim against a 
government for injury suffered by a UN agent in the performance of his 
duties, with the goal of “obtaining the reparation due in respect of the 
damage caused (a) to the United Nations, (b) to the victim or to persons 
entitled through him.”36 The resulting ICJ opinion, Reparation for Injuries 
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Reparation) is momentous.37 It 
recognizes that the UN does indeed have the capacity to bring an inter-
national claim against a State for damages resulting from a breach by that 
State of its international obligation. The ICJ also held that the UN has 
the capacity to exercise “functional protection in respect of its agents” 
regardless of the nationality of the agent.38  
In the doctrinal development of the individual’s position in interna-
tional law, Reparation is important for many reasons. First, the decision 
recognized that international organizations, namely the UN, have sepa-
rate legal personalities. The Court also recognized that: 
The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identi-
cal in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their na-
ture depends upon the needs of the community.39  
The Court likewise recognized the possibility of varied international sub-
jects and held that “[t]hroughout its history, the development of interna-
tional law has been influenced by the requirements of international life 
 
33 1 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF 
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 288 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1970) (“The decision amounts to a 
clear denial of the view that individuals can acquire rights only through the 
instrumentality of municipal legislation; it denies the exclusiveness of States as 
beneficiaries of international rights.”); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 174–75 (Grotius Pub. Ltd. rev. ed. 
1982) (1958). 
34 See LAUTERPACHT, DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 174. 
35 Parlett, supra note 31, at 141–45. 
36 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 174, at 175 (Apr. 9). 
37 See id.  
38 Id. at 184–85. 
39 Id. at 178. 
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. . . .”40 Thus, the ICJ also recognized the responsiveness of the interna-
tional legal system to the system’s needs. Importantly, Reparations recog-
nizes that international law has space for other subjects of the interna-
tional system that may have different rights and obligations than States. 
Being subjects of international law entails the possession of international 
rights and obligations, and the capacity to bring international claims. 
Significantly, this capacity is based on functional necessity, and it is not 
constrained by any nationality requirement.41 
More recently, the ICJ articulated this principle, and explicitly rec-
ognized the existence of individual rights created in international law. In 
LaGrand, the Court found that Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
created international individual rights alongside those of States. In this 
contentious decision, which Germany brought against the US, the ICJ 
confirmed that the rights created by the Vienna Convention are rights 
created by treaty, and that they belong to the individual.42 
 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 183–86. The ICJ is very clear that the claims arose from a breach of a 
duty owned to the UN where the nationality of the individual did not play a role.  
Having regard to its purposes and functions already referred to, the Organiza-
tion may find it necessary, and has in fact found it necessary, to entrust its agents 
with important missions to be performed in disturbed parts of the world. . . . For 
the same reason, the injuries suffered by its agents in these circumstances will 
sometimes have occurred in such a manner that their national State would not 
be justified in bringing a claim for reparation on the ground of diplomatic pro-
tection, or, at any rate, would not feel disposed to do so. Both to ensure the effi-
cient and independent performance of these missions and to afford effective 
support to its agents, the Organization must provide them with adequate protec-
tion. . . . It must be noted that the effective working of the Organization—the ac-
complishment of its task, and the independence and effectiveness of the work of 
its agents—require that these undertakings should be strictly observed. For that 
purpose, it is necessary that, when an infringement occurs, the Organization 
should be able to cal1 upon the responsible State to remedy its default, and, in 
particular, to obtain from the State reparation for the damage that the default 
may have caused to its agent. In order that the agent may perform his duties sat-
isfactorily, he must feel that this protection is assured to him by the Organiza-
tion, and that he may count on it. To ensure the independence of the agent, 
and, consequently, the independent action of the Organization itself, it is essen-
tial that in performing his duties he need not have to rely on any other protec-
tion than that of the Organization (save of course for the more direct and im-
mediate protection due from the State in whose territory he may be) . . . . The 
action of the Organization is in fact based not upon the nationality of the victim 
but upon his status as agent of the Organization. Therefore it does not matter 
whether or not the State to which the claim is addressed regards him as its own 
national, because the question of nationality is not pertinent to the admissibility 
of the claim. 
Id. 
42 LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. Rep 466, 494, 497 (June 
27) (“Based on the text of these provisions, the Court concludes that Article 36, 
paragraph 1, creates individual rights, which, by virtue of Article 1 of the Optional 
Protocol, may be invoked in this Court by the national State of the detained person. 
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Having discussed in the previous paragraphs the extraordinary doc-
trinal changes that occurred in recognizing individuals as subjects of in-
ternational law, it is important to consider why those changes occurred. 
What are the reasons that made the change possible—and what made 
them permanent? What explains the doctrinal shift in relation to the in-
dividual that lead to LaGrand? 
World War II certainly played a major role. World War II was a devas-
tating war that involved many countries and resulted in a very large num-
ber of casualties.43 The vulnerable position of the individual in interna-
tional society was very evident—proven by the enormous number of 
civilian casualties suffered on all sides.44 Many cities were destroyed in 
devastating bombing raids, and World War II only ended after the use of 
the first atomic bombs, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which by themselves 
killed over 100,000 civilians.45 
The war was not only an international war, but was in many ways a 
war characterized by competing ideologies, particularly the theorization 
of an especially callous ideology.46 Nazi Germany was not only at war with 
other countries in Europe, but also at war with parts of its population. 
This internal war targeted religious and ethnic minorities. It clearly 
demonstrated that the State could become an enemy of the individual, 
and even of its own nationals. Nazi Germany’s war against its own popula-
tion proved that the individual needed—as a consequence—to be able to 
be protected from the State itself.47 The individual needed to be emanci-
pated by the State’s supervision, and conquer her own space in interna-
tional discourse in order to obtain effective protection.48 
 
These rights were violated in the present case. . . . The Court has already determined 
that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights for the detained person in 
addition to the rights accorded the sending State, and that consequently the 
reference to ‘rights’ in paragraph 2 must be read as applying not only to the rights of 
the sending State, but also to the rights of the detained individual”). 
43 Battle Deaths Dataset Version 1.0, PEACE RES. INST. OSLO (2017), https://www. 
prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths/Old-versions/10/. 
44 ARLENE S. KANTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISABILITY RIGHTS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (2015). 
45 ROBERT PAPE, BOMBING TO WIN: AIRPOWER AND COERCION IN WAR 105–06 
(1996). 
46 KANTER, supra note 44, at 22. 
47 See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 291–92 (1958) (“[I]t 
turned out that the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to 
fall back upon their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no 
institution was willing to guarantee them.”). 
48 See, e.g., JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTION, PROCESS 
17 (2d ed. 2006) (“[T]he human tragedy of World War II led governments . . . to 
devote significant resources to the creation of a corpus of law aimed at protecting 
individuals from their own governments.”). 
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War and even genocides are not, unfortunately, unique to World 
War II, however.49 So why was the legacy of World War II so meaningful 
for the individual’s position in international law? One additional expla-
nation is that the war created a large number of refugees who fled their 
homes and resettled in other countries.50 This is consequential for two 
reasons. First, refugee resettlements became very visible, and this visibility 
influenced the political discourse in their new countries. Refugees were 
able to keep issues linked to the war and resettlement visible and dis-
cussed. Second, and possibly even more consequentially, refugees are the 
epitome of a State failing an individual.51 Refugees must flee their home 
country because that country persecutes them instead of protecting 
them. Hence, the individual’s vulnerability vis-à-vis the State became ap-
parent in the refugee crisis World War II produced. Significantly, in Rep-
aration, the Court reassured States that recognizing new subjects of inter-
national law did not diminish the State’s importance.52 International law 
is still essentially state-centric; new subjects of international law can exist 
parallel to States without diminishing the States’ standing. 
Another reason that may explain why World War II had a lasting ef-
fect on how the individual is perceived in international law is that World 
War II was a very visible war. Evidence of human sufferance was clearly 
visible in newspapers and cinemas.53 Photos of troops entering concentra-
tion camps circulated worldwide and the U.S. army had journalists and 
photographers who followed the troops and provided immediate and 
tangible evidence of the horror of war and the extent of human suffer-
ing. These public images helped consolidate the view that individuals 
were not sufficiently protected by their country of origin, and that more 
had to be done to guarantee basic rights directly to the individual. That 
outrage and call for action translated to an important policy shift. In the 
post-World War II period, States assigned duties and rights to individuals 
without necessarily going through domestic law. They also used interna-
 
49 Scott Lamb, Genocide Since 1945: Never Again?, DER SPEIGEL ONLINE (Jan. 26, 
2005), http://www.spiegel.de/international/genocide-since-1945-never-again-a-338612. 
html.  
50 The 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, UNHCR 1 (2002), http://www. 
unhcr.org/4ec262df9.pdf. 
51 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 
152 (the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as a 
person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country . . . .”). 
52 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion, supra note 36, at 186. 
53 Ben Cosgrove, The Photo That Won World War II: ‘Dead Americans at Buna Beach,’ 
1943, TIME MAGAZINE (Oct. 31, 2014), http://time.com/3524493/the-photo-that-won-
world-war-ii-dead-americans-at-buna-beach-1943/. 
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tional law.54 What can be seen is that individuals acquired rights, had ob-
ligations, and were offered redress.55 This was a change toward recogniz-
ing the individual as having an increasingly relevant personality in inter-
national law. 
But the occurrence of the war and its effects by themselves do not 
fully explain why the revolution of individual rights in international law 
lasted after the war. It is important then to consider the particular histor-
ical period in which World War II was fought. On one hand, it occurred 
not long after another deadly world conflict, World War I, which had also 
resulted in a massive loss of civilian and military lives.56 The end of the 
First World War also coincided with the Russian Revolution, which pro-
duced a massive wave of refugees seeking asylum in Europe. The protec-
tion of minorities and the war’s refugee crises highlighted the need to 
separate the interests of the individual from those of the State. Minority 
rights and refugees became issues discussed at Versailles Peace Confer-
ence and resulted in many policy decisions about the international pro-
tection of certain vulnerable individuals.57  
On the other hand, World War II also gave rise to a very different 
world. The international movement that led to the creation of the United 
Nations also resulted in an internalization of some of the war’s main 
themes. Anti-colonial movements flourished, demanding the independ-
ence and self-determination of people living in European colonies.58 The 
U.S. witnessed the civil rights movement, which firmly acknowledged the 
equality of all Americans and pushed for an end to discrimination.59 Eu-
rope saw the establishment of the European Economic Community and 
the Council of Europe. These movements were all conducive to a re-
 
54 This occurred in concurrence with the acceptance of other subjects in 
international law—notably international organizations. See SEAN MURPHY, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 388 (Lori Damrosh & Sean Murphy eds., 
6th ed. 2014) (“[I]nternational organizations . . . flourished following World War II, 
with the creation of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, and many other institutions.”). 
55 Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Position of the Individual in International Law, 31 
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 241, 255 (2000).  
56 World War I Casualties, WORLD HERITAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://self.gutenberg. 
org/articles/eng/World_War_I_casualties (last visited Aug. 26, 2018) (“The total 
number of military and civilian casualties in World War I was over 37 million: over 16 
million deaths and 20 million wounded, ranking it among the deadliest conflicts in 
human history.”).  
57 Antonija Petričušić, The Rights of Minorities in International Law: Tracing 
Developments in Normative Arrangements of International Organizations, CROATIAN INT’L 
REL. REV., 1, 2 (2005). 
58  Penny Von Eschen, Civil Rights and World War II in a Global Frame, in FOG OF 
WAR: THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 171 (Kevin M. Kruse 
& Stephen Tuck eds., 2012). 
59 See id. at 178–79. 
LCB_22_4_Article_1_Giorgetti (Do Not Delete) 3/1/2019  4:36 PM 
2018] RETHINKING THE INDIVIDUAL 1099 
thinking of what the individual’s position in the international arena 
should be vis-à-vis the State. 
Taken together, these issues help explain why the changes in the in-
dividual’s position vis-à-vis the State occurred, and how they initiated a re-
examination for a rationale of the State-centered system. The emancipa-
tion of the individual in international law started with gradual changes 
brought about by World War II. It is still going on, and this Article argues 
it could change entire areas of international law. 
Having discussed doctrinal changes in general, the sections below 
now specifically review the individual’s rights and obligations in some of 
the most significant areas of international law. This will show the extent 
to which the individual’s position in international law has already 
evolved. It will also acknowledge the space in which it can further evolve. 
B. International Human Rights: The Individual Acquires Rights 
The development of human rights law and the creation of enforcing 
instruments open to individuals played an essential and transformative 
role in acknowledging the individual as a subject of international law with 
a distinctive legal personality.60 This Section reviews this development. 
First, it shows the evolution of the human rights system and how it ulti-
mately grants international rights directly to the individual. Second, it 
briefly explains how the individual can directly enforce her human rights 
under international law. Third, it explains this development in a more 
theoretical aspect. 
Starting mostly after World War II, members of the international 
community adopted a series of instruments that recognized that individ-
uals have certain basic universal rights under international law, which are 
common to all, which States had the obligation to respect.61 This devel-
opment can certainly be seen as a reaction to the atrocities committed 
during World War II, though the seeds were already visible in the inter-
war period.62 These international instruments included declarations and 
binding instruments that built up incrementally. The process started with 
political and inspirational commitments and culminated in the creation 
 
60 ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE 
USE IT 95 (1994) (noting that international human rights law provides direct rights to 
individuals and increasingly access to tribunals and forums to guarantee such rights).  
61 W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International 
Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 871 (1990) (arguing that the international law of human 
rights rendered much of the pre-existing international law anachronistic). 
62 PARLETT, supra note 14, at 279 (tracing the history of human rights protection 
to the movement for the abolition of slavery and the provision protecting minorities 
included in the peace treaties and declarations signed after World War I); LYNN 
HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY 200 (2007); PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE 
EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN 104 (2d ed. 2003). 
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of international legal obligations which created, in certain instances, en-
forceable individual rights under international law.63 
The United Nations Charter itself, which established the UN, con-
tains in its very preamble a powerful reference to the importance of hu-
man rights.64 The Charter includes several direct mentions to human 
rights65, including in the fundamental Article 1(3), which affirms that 
one of the purposes of the United Nations is to promote and encourage 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms “for all” and “with-
out distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”66 As articulated in 
the Charter, the provisions are more inspirational than prescriptive.67 Yet, 
they also definitely underline the centrality of individuals’ human rights 
in post-World War II political and legal systems. 
An equally important, and more specific, declaration—the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights—was proclaimed in 1948 by the General 
Assembly.68 In it, the General Assembly proclaimed “a common standard 
 
63 LAUREN, supra note 62, at 109. 
64 U.N. Charter preamble, June 26, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI (stating that the people 
of the United Nations were determined “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small”); see generally 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY (Bruno Simma, et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012). 
65 U.N. Charter art. 1(3), 13(1), 55, 56 (in reference to art. 55), 62(2), 68, 76.  
66 U.N. Charter, supra note 65, at art. 1(3) (in its entirety, the beautiful Article 1 
states that “The Purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain international 
peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of 
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and 
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace; 2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other 
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; 3. To achieve international 
cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion; and 4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the 
attainment of these common ends.”). 
67 See id. at 5, 12. For example, art. 13 asserts that the General Assembly “shall 
initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of . . . promoting 
international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health 
fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” and art. 55 states the UN 
should promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.” 
68 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) (Dec. 10, 1948), 
http://www.un-documents.net/a3r217a.htm [hereinafter UDHR]; see generally THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 
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of achievement for all people and all nations” to promote the respect for 
human rights and “secure their universal and effective recognition and 
observance.”69 The Declaration is a momentous document because it 
enumerated for the first time specific individual rights to which everyone 
is entitled, “without distinction of any kind,” including the “right to life, 
liberty and security of person,” the prohibition of slavery and torture, the 
right to recognition as a person, equality under the law, the right to ef-
fective remedy and to a fair and public hearing by an impartial tribunal, 
the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention, and arbitrary interfer-
ence with privacy and a family.70 
After these post-World War II developments, many years had to pass 
for the next comprehensive and general treaty. The first universal and 
general human rights conventions containing binding legal obligations 
for States were approved several years later in 1966. Other, more specific, 
binding legal instruments also followed. The Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights (ICCPR)71 and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultur-
al Rights (ICESCR) were both adopted in December 1966 and were en-
tered into force in 1976.72 Individual rights can also be found in several 
specific subject-matter conventions adopted in the same period and later. 
By adopting these conventions, State Parties were obligated to give effect 
to certain rights, impose obligations to prevent and suppress acts that 
contravene those rights, and also detail specific individual rights.73 The 
 
1993). 
69 UDHR, supra note 68, at pmbl. 
70 Id. at arts. 13–21. Other recognized rights include freedom of movement, right 
to seek asylum, the right to a nationality, right to marry and form a family, the right 
to property, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of peaceful 
assembly and association and right to take part in government.  
71 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 173 [hereinafter ICCPR]. There are presently 169 parties to the ICCPR. 
The ICCPR is a multilateral convention that binds each State Party to respect and 
ensure “to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction” certain 
rights, including the right to life, family, religion, liberty and security of person, and 
of equality before the law. The direct reference to the fact that rights belong to the 
individual and that they are given and owed to all individuals is clear. 
72 See infra note 80, at arts. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 13, 15. The ICESCR commits Member 
States to “take steps” with a view of progressively achieving certain economic, social 
and cultural rights, such as the right to health, education, social security and 
adequate standards of living. It also contains some specific binding undertakings, 
including ensuring equality between men and women in the enjoyment of economic, 
social and cultural rights, ensuring the right to form and join unions, the recognition 
of the rights of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favorable conditions of work, 
the right to free primary education and the right to take part in cultural life. 
73 See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 
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first was the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion (CERD) which entered into force in 1969 and contains both State 
obligations and individual rights.74 
Similar key developments occurred both faster and sooner at the re-
gional level, especially in Europe. The European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) was approved by the European Council and opened for 
signatures in Rome in 1950.75 It requires signatories to secure “to every-
one within their jurisdiction” certain rights and freedoms enumerated in 
the Charter.76 Today, many of the rights enumerated in the ECHR are en-
joyed specifically by the individual. For example, Art. 4 states that “[n]o 
one shall be held in slavery or servitude” and Art. 5 provides that 
“[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of person.”77 A similar 
development occurred in the Americas with the American Convention 
on Human Rights, which clearly states in its preamble that: 
essential rights of man are not derived from one’s being a na-
tional of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of the 
human personality, and that they therefore justify international 
protection in the form of a convention reinforcing or comple-
menting the protection provided by the domestic law of the 
American states.78  
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights followed a few 
years later and contains similar language recognizing direct rights to the 
individual.79 
 
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. 
74 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD]. States Parties to 
CERD undertake in Art. 5 “to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its 
forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, 
or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law.” Parties also specifically 
undertake to ensure the enjoyment of the several rights, including: the right to equal 
treatment before tribunals and other organs administering justice, the right to 
security of person, political rights, the right to freedom of movement and residence, 
the right to leave any country, the right to marriage, the right to own property, 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
75 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 
[hereinafter ECHR]. 
76 Id. at art. 1. 
77 Id. at arts 4 and 5. 
78 American Convention on Human Rights, Pact of San Jose, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123. 
79 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 
1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (note in the preamble the Charter recognized “that fundamental 
human rights stem from the attributes of human beings, which justifies their national 
and international protection”). 
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The overview above shows a steady development towards the recog-
nition of individual human rights. Yet this development is neither linear 
nor uniform: it shows substantive regional variations, with significant 
moments of pauses between bouts of action. After a burst of activity in 
the period immediately following World War II, the evolution then 
stalled because of the political entrenchment that characterized the Cold 
War. Human rights became political, and two groups formed on the is-
sue. One championed primarily civil and political rights, and the other 
primarily supported economic, cultural and social rights.80 A third wave 
of human rights, including the right to development, health, and a clean 
environment, also created new constituencies and reaffirmed the notion 
that the issue of human rights is continuingly evolving.81 
The numerous instruments analyzed above—from the universal and 
general to the regional and specific—all point to two significant devel-
opments in the gradual recognition of the individual as a legal entity in 
international law. First, these instruments recognize that human rights 
are rights of the individual under international law. Second, legal texts 
assert that States are bound to provide rights to all persons under the 
State’s jurisdiction, regardless of their nationality.82 For example, ECHR 
provides in no uncertain terms that parties must secure “to everyone in 
their jurisdiction” the rights and freedoms provided in the charter. No 
reference is made to nationality or citizenship. These are human rights, 
 
80 The U.S. has signed, but not ratified the ICESCR. See, e.g., International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https:// 
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4& 
clang=_en (the U.S. has signed, but not ratified the ICESCR); International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ 
ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en (Russia ratified 
the ICCPR on Oct. 16, 1973). 
81 Karel Vasak, A 30-Year Struggle: The Sustained Efforts to Give Force of Law to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 30 UNESCO COURIER 29, 29 (1977). 
82 CRC, supra note 73, at art. 2(1) (“States Parties shall respect and ensure the 
rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction 
without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or 
legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.”); CERD, 
supra note 74, at art. 6 (“States Parties shall assure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, through the competent national 
tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination which 
violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention, as 
well as the right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate reparation or 
satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination.”) (though 
note Art. 1(2) “This Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, 
restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens 
and non-citizens.”); ECHR, supra note 75, at art. 1 (“The High Contracting Parties 
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
Section I of this Convention.”). 
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available to all. In the word of former ICJ President Rosalyn Higgins, 
“[o]nce it is recognized that obligations are owed to individuals (because 
they have rights) then there is no reason of logic why the obligation 
should be owed only to foreign individuals, and not to nationals.”83 
A third development is also important: the direct enforceability of 
these individual rights under international law in the international legal 
system. The strongest direct enforceability instrument is found in the 
ECHR Protocol 11, which entered into force on November 1, 1998.84 This 
allows for the right for direct individual access to the Court and imposes 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court for all the State Parties. This form of 
direct enforceability remains, to be sure, unique.85 Alternatively, universal 
instruments contain periodical reporting duties. The ICCPR, for exam-
ple, has established a Human Rights Committee to review periodical re-
ports by State Parties on the measures they have adopted “which give ef-
fect” to the rights recognized in the ICCPR and on the “progress made in 
the enjoyment of those rights.”86 Similarly, State Parties to ICESCR must 
also agree to submit periodical reports to the UN Secretary General, who 
will transmit these reports to the Economic and Social Council.87 Finally, 
certain human rights instruments, for example the ICCPR, include the 
possibility of bringing individual complaints and special communication 
to the body in charge of reviewing the implementation of the treaty pro-
visions.88 
In sum, the acquisition of personal human rights by the individual 
has been an extraordinary development, and includes a variety of differ-
ent rights. Individuals have rights recognized by numerous international 
treaties. These rights belong to individuals, and States are under an obli-
gation to provide them. 
This extraordinary development in which the individual acquired 
rights enforceable under international law occurred in parallel to anoth-
er equally significant development—the acquisition by the individual of 
obligations under international law to not commit certain crimes. The 
section below explains this development and its significance in the grad-
 
83 HIGGINS, supra note 60, at 95–96. 
84 Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, May 11, 1994, E.T.S. No. 155 [hereinafter Protocol No. 11]. 
85 AA Conçado Trinidade, The Procedural Capacity of the Individual as Subject of 
International Human Rights Law: Recent Developments, in LES DROITS DE L’HOMME À 
L’AUBE DU XXIE SIÈCLE 521, 540, 543 (K Vasak ed., Bruylant Bruxells 1999). 
86 ICCPR, supra note 71, at art. 40(1). 
87 ICESCR, supra note 72, at art. 16(2)(a). 
88 See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; see also Human Rights Bodies – Complaints 
Procedures, UN HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/ 
Pages/HRTBPetitions.aspx#individualcomm (last visited Aug. 26, 2018) (listing all 
human rights treaties with individual complaint mechanisms).  
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ual recognition of the individual as having legal personality under inter-
national law. 
C. International Criminal Law: The Individual Assumes Obligations 
In the section above, I discussed how the individual has acquired a 
certain degree of international legal personality, and now enjoys individ-
ual human rights under international law that are, to a certain extent, 
enforceable by the individual. The section below makes a similar substan-
tive argument, but from the prospective of the individual acquiring obli-
gations stemming directly from international law. 
The acquisition of individual criminal responsibility under interna-
tional law is a significant step towards the recognition of the international 
legal personality of the individual. This important development largely 
occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. In Au-
gust 1945, the U.S., UK, Russia, and France signed the London Agree-
ment, in which the parties agreed to create an International Military Tri-
bunal (IMT) to try war criminals.89 The Charter of the IMT provides that 
it has “the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of 
the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of 
organisations” committed crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.90 The Charter specifically recognized that crimes with-
in its jurisdiction were based on “individual responsibility.”91 
 
89 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of 
the European Axis art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S  279 (“There shall be established 
after consultation with the Control Council for Germany an International Military 
Tribunal for the trial of war criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical 
location whether they be accused individually or in their capacity as members of 
organisations or groups or in both capacities.”). 
90 London Agreement, Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 
8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S 279, 288 (The crimes are defined, respectively: “(a) Crimes against 
peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a 
war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation 
in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing; (b) 
War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall 
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or 
for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of 
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or 
devastation not justified by military necessity; (c) Crimes against humanity: namely, 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions 
on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.”). 
91 Id. at 288. 
LCB_22_4_Article_1_Giorgetti (Do Not Delete) 3/1/2019  4:36 PM 
1106 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:4 
This was a momentous recognition. Though (similarly to what we 
have seen in the development of human rights) the seeds for this devel-
opment were already planted prior to the war, it was the atrocities com-
mitted during the conflict, and the Allied Powers’ resolve to address 
them and construct a new world order, that truly made the development 
of international criminal law possible.92  
Recognition of individual criminal responsibility for international 
crimes was not without criticism. In its final judgment, the IMT specifical-
ly addressed some of those and noted that: 
It was submitted [by defense counsel] that international law is 
concerned with the actions of sovereign states, and provides no 
punishment for individuals; and further, that where the act in 
question is an act of state, those who carry it out are not person-
ally responsible, but are protected by the doctrine of the sover-
eignty of the State. In the opinion of the Tribunal, both these 
submissions must be rejected. That international law imposes 
duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon states has 
long been recognized.93 
The Tribunal continued its analysis and clearly articulated the reasons 
behind its conclusion in a famous and seminal passage: 
enough has been said to show that individuals can be punished 
for violations of international law. Crimes against international 
law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provi-
sions of international law be enforced.94 
By referring directly to the fact that crimes are committed by people, the 
Tribunal highlighted the reason why recognizing individual criminal re-
sponsibility is necessary in international law. The individual is not only 
part of the State, but also acts independently from the State. The Tribu-
nal made this point again when it tackled the argument of immunity 
claimed by certain defendants who maintained that they were acting on 
behalf of the State. The Tribunal concluded that the: 
essence of the Charter is that individuals have international du-
ties which transcend the national obligations of obedience im-
posed by the individual state. He who violates the laws of war 
cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the au-
 
92 PARLETT, supra note 14, at 308–09.  
93 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major 
War Criminals, Nuremberg, Judgment, Sept. 30 and Oct 1, 1946, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 
(citing Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)). 
94 Id. 
LCB_22_4_Article_1_Giorgetti (Do Not Delete) 3/1/2019  4:36 PM 
2018] RETHINKING THE INDIVIDUAL 1107 
thority of the state if the state in authorizing action moves out-
side its competence under International Law.95 
The significance of the Tribunal’s conclusion, and the clarity in 
which it was expressed, was readily acknowledged. In December 1946, the 
UN General Assembly, upon suggestion by the Secretary General, di-
rected the International Law Commission—a body of experts tasked with 
codifying international law—to “[f]ormulate the principles of interna-
tional law recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal, and in 
the judgment of the Tribunal” and “[p]repare a draft code of offences 
against the peace and security of mankind.”96 The ILC presented an ap-
proved draft to the General Assembly in 1950. It included provisions rec-
ognizing individual responsibility for certain crimes under international 
law.97 The General Assembly acknowledged these principles, but took no 
further action.98 Indeed, many years had to pass until the issue was taken 
up again. But when it was ready to be discussed again, individual criminal 
responsibility for international crimes was resurrected with renewed 
strength, first by the creation of two ad hoc tribunals charged with prose-
cuting individuals under international criminal law, and then by the crea-
tion of an international court with the mandate to do the same on a 
more permanent and universal level. These advances are explained next. 
In the early 1990s, at the end of the Cold War, the international 
community was confronted with two events that resulted in serious and 
protracted violations of international criminal law being committed: the 
dissolution of the Republic of Yugoslavia starting in 1991—the first major 
conflict in Europe since the end of World War II—and the 1994 killing of 
an estimated 800,000 people in a horrific genocidal rampage in Rwanda. 
Among the more successful actions taken by the Security Council, acting 
under the mandatory powers of Chapter VII to address these situations 
were the establishment of two ad hoc international criminal tribunals: the 
 
95 Id.  
96 Summary Records and Documents of the First Session including the Report of the 
Commission to the General Assembly, Formulation of the Nürnberg Principles and Preparation 
of a Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1949] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 4, U.N. Doc. A/925. 
97 Report of the International Law Commission On Its Second Session, 5 June - 29 July 
1950, 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 374, part III, ¶ 97-–99, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/34. Principle 
I states “Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under 
international law is responsible thereof and liable to punishment” and Principle II 
provides that “[t]he fact that international law does not impose a penalty for an act 
which constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who 
committed the act from responsibility under international law.” 
98 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 955, Annex art. 1 (November 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 
1993). 
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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).99  
These were significant and momentous developments, which were 
also the product of unique historical circumstances. The early 1990s was 
a period of renewed activity in international law. The Cold War had just 
ended. Russia and the U.S. had a brief period in which their interests 
aligned. Neither used their veto power at the Security Council to stop 
each other’s actions.100 Additionally, the genocide in Rwanda and the Civ-
il War in the former Yugoslavia were the subject of many televised broad-
casts. Thus, both crises were very visible and generated a public outcry, 
which called for action (which many nonetheless considered to have oc-
curred too late and delivered too little).101 The events in the former Yu-
goslavia were also the first large-scale violations of humanitarian law to 
have occurred on European soil since the Holocaust, and some of the 
atrocities perpetrated there were a terrible reminder of atrocities com-
mitted during the Second World War.102 Similarly, the genocide in Rwan-
da was such an atrocious and visible violation of humanitarian law that it 
struck a chord in the human collective.103 UN Peacekeepers were present 
in Rwanda at the time and were unable to respond. The world initially 
failed Rwanda and did not respond to its request for assistance. But when 
the realities of what had happened sank in, the call for a punishment for 
the perpetrators grew stronger. Though realists would say that the crea-
tion of these ad hoc tribunals were a low-cost political action, the signifi-
cance in international law was profound, reckoning immediately back to 
the Nuremberg trials and the advances in international criminal respon-
sibility of the individual that developed there.104 The reaffirmation of Nu-
 
99 See Santiago Villalpando, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, in THE RULES, PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 233, 234 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2012); see also Robert D. Sloane, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in THE RULES, PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE 
OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 261, 262 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2012). 
100 See UNITED NATIONS, Security Council—Veto List, http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/ 
resguide/scact_veto_table_en.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2018). 
101 See, e.g., MAX HILLAIRE, WAGING PEACE: THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
AND TRANSNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 80 (2015). 
102 See Omarska: A Vision of Hell, BBC NEWS (Nov. 2, 2001), http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1634250.stm (“Not since World War II had the faces of half-
starved, semi-naked prisoners stared out from behind barbed wire in Europe.”).  
103 John Eriksson et. al., The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons 
from the Rwanda Experience, ORG. FOR ECON. DEV. COOPERATION (March 2006), http:// 
www.oecd.org/derec/sweden/50189495.pdf. 
104 See, e.g., Makau Mutua, From Nuremberg to the Rwanda Tribunal: Justice or 
Retribution?, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 77, 90 (2000) (“From a distance, it is possible to 
see the Rwanda Tribunal as different from the Yugoslav Tribunal and as an 
approximation of Nuremberg. The temptation to equate the military defeat of the 
Hutu regime by the Tutsi RPF and their removal from office with the Nazis is 
incorrect. Such analogy would only make sense if the targets of the Holocaust—
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remberg’s principles forty years later was important and mobilized sub-
stantial momentum for the creation of a permanent court.105 
Both the ICTY and the ICTR explicitly recognize individual criminal 
responsibility under international law. Art. 1 of the Statute of the ICTY, 
for example, gives the Tribunal the “power to prosecute persons respon-
sible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.”106 The 
principle of individual criminal responsibility is clearly articulated in Art. 
7, which states that a person who “planned, instigated, ordered, commit-
ted or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning” of grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions, war crimes, genocide or crimes against humani-
ty “shall be individually responsible for the crime.”107 The Statute of the 
ICTR also includes the principle of individual criminal responsibility, in 
essentially the same terms as ICTY.108 Art. 1 gives the ICTR the power “to 
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international hu-
manitarian law committed.”109 Art. 6 specifically provides for individual 
criminal responsibility.110  
 
Jews—had themselves defeated the Germans and taken control of the state. The war 
in Rwanda is unfinished.”). See also Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of 
Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 554, 554 (describing the history of international 
criminal law from Nuremberg to modern times).  
105 See Mark D. Kielsgard, War on the International Criminal Court, 8 N.Y. CITY L. 
REV. 1, 4–5 (2005) (“In 1993 and 1995 the Security Council formed two ad hoc 
tribunals for trial of serious violations of humanitarian law in Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
Rwanda (ICTR). . . . [t]hese tribunals are new expressions of previously 
accepted principles of the inalienability of human rights and the individual 
accountability of violators who commit atrocities.”). 
106 U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of 
Security Council Resolution 808, art. 1, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (stating, in its 
entirety “The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the 
present Statute.”). 
107 Id. at art. 7; see generally Bartram S. Brown, Nationality and Internationality in 
International Humanitarian Law, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 347 (1998). 
108 S.C. Res. 955, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as 
last amended on Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3952c.html. 
109 S.C. Res. 955, Annex art. 1 (November 8, 1994) (reading, in its entirety “The 
International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed 
in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 
1994, in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.”). 
110 Id. at art. 6(1); id. at art. 8(1). “The International Tribunal for Rwanda and 
national courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons responsible 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan citizens for such violations committed in the territory of 
neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.” 
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Defendants in both ICTY and ICTR proceedings brought actions to 
object to the Tribunals’ jurisdiction.111 The ICTR jurisdictional decision 
in Kanyabashi is particularly interesting for analyzing the evolution of in-
dividual criminal responsibility. In it, the ICTR Trial Chamber responded 
directly to an objection to jurisdiction by the defense, which challenged 
the tribunal’s jurisdiction over individuals directly under international 
law. In its decision rejecting the challenge, the Trial Chamber cited the 
Prosecution’s argument that the Nuremberg Trials had already “estab-
lished that individuals who have committed crimes under international 
law can be held criminally responsible directly under international 
law.”112 The Chamber specifically recalled that the question of direct indi-
vidual responsibility under international law had been a controversial is-
sue in many legal systems, and that even the Nuremberg trials had been 
interpreted differently in relation to its conclusion regarding the position 
of the individual as a subject under international law.113 Yet, the Chamber 
found the creation of the ad hoc tribunals to be resolutive of the question 
and concluded that: 
By establishing the two International Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda . . . the Security Council explicit-
ly extended international legal obligations and criminal respon-
sibilities directly to individuals for violations of international 
humanitarian law.114 
The ICTR made clear that the individual responsibility for international 
crimes exists, and the creation of the ICTY and ICTR by the Security 
Council are sufficient proof of that.  
Significantly, the creation of the ICTY and ICTR also reignited a 
long-standing debate about the creation of a permanent court for inter-
national crimes. The ILC was tasked to prepare a code articulating the 
legal and procedural framework for such a court after Nuremberg, but 
the process stalled. The creation of the ICTY and ICTR provided re-
newed interest, public pressure, and theoretical backbone.  
A final and essential validation of the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility under international law was the creation of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC).115 The ICC, which was established through 
the 1998 Rome Statute and become operational in 2002, is a permanent 
 
111 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Oct. 2, 1995). 
112 Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR 96-15-T, Decision on The Defence 
Motion on Jurisdiction ¶ 34, (Int’l Crim. Trib. For Rwanda June 18, 1997). 
113 Id. ¶ 35. 
114 Id. 
115 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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international court with general prospective international criminal law 
jurisdiction.116 In the Court’s Statute, individual responsibility became a 
general principle of criminal responsibility. Art. 25 provides that “[a] 
person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court [geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes] shall be individually re-
sponsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.”117 
As a result of this important development, it is now recognized that 
international criminal law imposes individual criminal responsibility.118 
These individual obligations are found in international criminal law. 
Genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are both individual 
and international crimes. 
The doctrinal development that resulted in the acquisition of inter-
national rights and responsibilities by the individual is particularly visible 
in the international human rights law and criminal law explored so far. A 
similar but less uniform development exists in other areas of internation-
al law, which are explored in the next section. 
D. Individual Rights in Other Fields of International Law 
The acceptance that individuals may, under certain circumstances, 
be subjects of international law is an “important shift in the structure of 
international law,” which “reduces the traditional State-centrism.”119 With 
this shift, individuals have altered their positions and standing in interna-
tional law, in the same way shareholders changed their positions when 
piercing the corporate veil.120 And in the same way that shareholders’ 
rights are not the same as corporation’s rights, the rights of individuals 
are not the same as States’. These rights are different and unique. As the 
ICJ explained in Reparation “[t]he subjects of law in any legal system are 
not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, 
and their nature depends upon the needs of the community.”121 
 
116 See generally Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some 
Preliminary Reflections, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 144, 145 (1999).  
117 Rome Statute, supra note 115, art. 25(2). 
118 PARLETT, supra note 14, at 229 (“It is now widely acknowledged that individual 
criminal responsibility is imposed on individuals though international criminal law”). 
119 Walter, supra note 9, ¶18 (“[T]he general acceptance of individuals as—
partial—subjects of international law marks an important shift in the structure of 
international law”). 
120 Jonathan Macey and Joshua Mitts, Finding Order in the Morass: Three Real 
Justifications for Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 105 (2014); Robert 
B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 
1041 (1991). For an international law approach, see, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light 
and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 45, ¶ 81, 50, ¶ 101 (Feb. 5, 1970) 
(holding that only the State in which the corporation was incorporated (Canada) can 
sue, and not the State of nationality of the stockholders (Belgium)).  
121 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory 
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The sections above highlighted developments in two specific areas of 
international law. In addition to human rights and international criminal 
obligations, the individual has acquired, in the last few decades, a consid-
erable array of diverse international rights. Professor Anne Peters notes 
the increasing frequency in which “international legal norms directly ad-
dress and engage individuals”122 and observes that individual rights under 
international law arise: 
from extradition treaties, treaties of friendship and establish-
ment, double taxation agreements, transport treaties, intellectu-
al property treaties, investment protection treaties, treaties on 
the legal status of foreigners, and the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations.123 
Individuals also enjoy other rights under international law. For example, 
several international humanitarian law provisions include references to 
rights and entitlements of the individuals in addition to those applicable 
to States.124 These include Articles 7 and 8 of the Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War125, and Arti-
cles 14, 78, 84 and 105 of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War.126 
 
Opinion, supra note 36, at 178.; see also id. at 179 (“[T]he Court has come to the 
conclusion that the Organization is an international person. That is not the same 
thing as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality 
and rights and duties are the same as those of a State. Still less is it the same thing as 
saying that it is ‘a super-State’, whatever that expression may mean. It does not even 
imply that all its rights and duties must be upon the international plane, any more 
that all the rights and duties of a State must be upon that plane.”). 
122 PETERS, supra note 8, at 1.  
123 Id. (noting that “individual rights under international law appear to arise from 
extradition treaties, treaties of friendship and establishment, double taxation 
agreements, transport treaties, intellectual property treaties, investment protection 
treaties, treaties on the legal status of foreigners, and the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations”). On issues of intellectual property, for example the 2012 Beijing 
Treaty on Audiovisual Performances grants performers certain economic rights for 
their audiovisual and live performances (including the right of reproduction, the 
right of distribution, the right of rental, the right of broadcasting) as well as moral 
rights. The rights guarantee economic development and improve the status of 
audiovisual performers. The terms of the treaty provide that each contracting party 
needs to adopt measures necessary to ensure the application of the Treaty and ensure 
that enforcement procedures are available. 
124 See Gorski, supra note 7, ¶ 23. 
125 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War art. 7, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (“No special agreement shall adversely 
affect the situation of protected persons, as defined by the present Convention, nor 
restrict the rights which it confers upon them. Protected persons shall continue to 
have the benefit of such agreements as long as the Convention is applicable to them, 
except where express provisions to the contrary are contained in the aforesaid or in 
subsequent agreements, or where more favourable measures have been taken with 
regard to them by one or other of the Parties to the conflict.”); id. art. 8 (“Protected 
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A relatively prolific area of international law providing direct rights 
to individuals is international economic law. These rights come mostly 
from international bilateral treaties (BITs) relating to foreign invest-
ments. BITs typically grant foreign investors several rights in the invest-
ment host country, including the right of fair and equitable treatment, a 
protection against illegal expropriations and arbitrary treatment, a cer-
tain number of basic rights based on best practice vis-à-vis other foreign 
and domestic investors.127 
A subset of individual rights are those individuals enjoy when repre-
senting and acting on behalf of the State, such as when they serve as Pres-
idents, Ministers and Ambassadors. These rights include diplomatic im-
munity, which grants certain individuals safe passage, and immunity from 
lawsuit or prosecution.128 Similarly, certain individuals are also protected 
when living as a foreigner abroad, for example, by the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations.129 
The ICJ has recognized that individuals enjoy specific individual 
rights under international law. In the 2001 LaGrand Case, brought by 
Germany against the US, the Court confirmed that “Article 36, paragraph 
1 [of the Vienna Convention], creates individual rights.”130 Similarly, in 
 
persons may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to 
them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the 
foregoing Article, if such there be.”).  
126 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 14, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 137; id. art. 78; id. art. 84 (“In no circumstances whatever 
shall a prisoner of war be tried by a court of any kind which does not offer the 
essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally recognized, and, 
in particular, the procedure of which does not afford the accused the rights and 
means of defence provided for in Article 105.”); id. art. 105. See also Treaties, States 
Parties and Commentaries: Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 
Geneva, 12 August 1949: Commentary of 1960, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument& 
documentId=63FED80AE19E8E88C12563CD00427AA6 (last visited Sep. 27, 2018) 
(stating, in reference to art. 78 “[t]he present chapter refers to one of the 
fundamental rights which the Convention provides for prisoners of war: the right of 
each of them to make comments on the conditions of captivity.”). 
127 See International Investment Agreements Navigator, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last visited Aug. 26, 2018). 
128 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 
95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
129 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261. 
130 LaGrand Case, supra note 42, at 494, ¶ 77; see also Case Concerning Avena and 
other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, 35 (Mar. 31) (“The 
Court would first observe that the individual rights of Mexican nationals under 
paragraph I (b) of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention are rights which are to be 
asserted, at any rate in the first place, within the domestic legal system of the United 
States. Only when that process is completed and local remedies are exhausted would 
Mexico be entitled to espouse the individual claims of its nationals through the 
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the subsequent Diallo Case, which Guinea brought against The Democrat-
ic Republic of Congo, the ICJ noted the “substantive development of in-
ternational law over recent decades in respect of the rights it accords to 
individuals”131 and declared Guinea’s application to be admissible in “so 
far as it concerns protection of Mr. Diallo’s rights as an individual.”132  
Importantly, the sources of the individual’s international rights are 
also varied.133 While it is safe to say that most come from bilateral or mul-
tilateral treaties, many other rights derive from international customary 
law. Several human rights are considered part of international customary 
law. These “would certainly include the prohibition of torture, genocide 
and slavery”134 as well as the principle of non-discrimination.135 More re-
cently, resolutions of the UN Security Council have created obligations 
directly for individuals.136 This is especially true for resolutions related to 
terrorism. For example, in Res. 2178, the Security Council “demand[ed] 
that all foreign terrorist fighters disarm and cease all terrorist acts and 
participation in conflict.”137 Several Security Council Resolutions also im-
pose economic sanctions and travel bans directly to individuals.138 
The progressive recognition of individual rights has not been a line-
ar process, but rather a complex development that included reconsidera-
tion and reassessment of other essential principles in international law.139 
To understand this tension, it is important to remember that in addition 
to the recognition of human rights, the UN Charter also enshrines the 
core principle of sovereignty: the idea that States are sovereigns within 
their borders, and other States cannot intervene in the internal affairs of 
a State.140 This provision mirrors those found in Article 15 (8) of the Cov-
 
procedure of diplomatic protection.”). 
131 Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), 
Preliminary Objections Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 582, 599 (May 24).  
132 Id. at 617. 
133 PETERS, supra note 8, at 408–31. 
134 SHAW, supra note 24, at 217. 
135 See generally Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International 
Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 3 (1996). 
136 PETERS, supra note 8, at 507 (“Security Council resolutions may impose 
obligations on individuals directly under international law.”). 
137 S.C. Res. 2178 ¶ 1. (Sept. 24, 2014). 
138 E.g., S.C. Res. 2136 (2014) (applying financial and travel sanctions to certain 
individuals in the DRC that recruit or use children in armed conflict); see generally 
PETERS, supra note 8, at 93-5, 508-9. 
139 Michael Wood, Non-Intervention (Non-Interference in Domestic Affairs), 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PRINCETONEINSIS, http://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/258 (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2018). 
140 U.N. Charter, supra note 65, at art. 2(7) (“Nothing contained in the present 
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members 
to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle 
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enant of the League of Nations and the Montevideo Convention on 
Rights and Duties of States of 1933, which prohibited “interference with 
the freedom, the sovereignty or other internal affairs, or the processes of 
the Governments of other nations.” During the Cold War, this principle 
was supported by both socialist and capitalist powers. This tension still ex-
ists, as recent events demonstrate. In 2011 and 2012, for example, China 
and Russia vetoed Security Council resolutions on Syria on the basis that 
they would unduly interfere with Syrian sovereignty. The resolutions were 
based on documented war crimes and crimes against humanity commit-
ted by the Syrian Armed Forces, and were limited to calling for Syria to 
put an end to all human rights violations.141 
The struggle that exists between the principle of sovereignty and the 
protection of human rights in the Charter mirrors the struggle between 
recognizing the State as the sole actor in international law and the slow 
recognition of the individual as an actor and subject of international 
law.142 Adding the individual as a subject of international law has proven 
to be easier said in theory than done in practice, however. Indeed, when 
international rights are given to the individual, the State had to relin-
quish a certain amount of sovereignty it possessed over the individual. In 
the Westphalian world, the State began with full sovereignty over the in-
dividual; in the post-Westphalian world that recognizes the individual as a 
subject of international law, the State has had to give up some of its pow-
er in favor of the individual. As such, the relative balance of power 
changed. In addition, it is also important to note that the interest of the 
State and the individual are not always aligned. In some situations, con-
flicts of interest exist between the interest of the State and the interest of 
the individual.143 These conflicts may derive from divergent strategic, po-
litical, and financial interests.144 
Anne Peters notes a “paradigm shift”145 in the recognition of the le-
gal status of the individual in international law, and other international 
law scholars “have around the turn of the millennium noted a transfor-
 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”). 
141  S.C. Res. 538, ¶¶ 4, 5, 8, 9 (July 19, 2012); S.C. Res. 612, ¶¶ 1, 4, 5, 12 (Oct. 4, 
2011).  
142 William Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law: Structural Realignment 
and Substantive Pluralism, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 77 (2015) (“[R]eassertion of the 
centrality of the State conflicts with the individualization of international law . . . .”). 
143 See LEA BRILMAYER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS COMMISSIONS: RIGHTING 
WRONGS AFTER CONFLICT 62–63 (2017) (explaining the inherent conflicts of interest 
present when monetary compensations are awarded for individual violations and can 
be paid either directly to the State or to the individual). 
144 See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation, 
104 AM. J. INT’L. L. 179, 182–96 (2010). 
145 PETERS, supra note 8, at 1. 
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mation of the international system.”146 This emancipation is, however, in-
complete.147 The asymmetric progress of recognizing the individual as a 
subject in international law is particularly evident in the discrepancy that 
exists between the doctrinal approach, which largely recognizes the in-
creasing rights of individuals in international law, and the slow ac-
ceptance of this evolution in practice. As explained above, doctrinal 
changes in the role of individuals are evident both in terms of the variety 
of substantive international rights that the individual enjoys, and the 
sources of law of these individual rights (which include international cus-
tomary law, Security Council resolutions, and treaties). Procedurally, 
however, these changes have been slow. 
One visible roadblock to the path of recognizing the individual in in-
ternational law is the fact that under most circumstances, individual in-
ternational rights can only be exercised through diplomatic protection or 
through the link to an international claim provided by nationality. In 
practice, therefore, while the individual now enjoys multiple internation-
al rights, the venues open to directly exercising those rights are few. The 
recognition of a new legal order that includes individuals as subjects dis-
tinct from States will have to include the recognition of procedural rights 
that individuals may exercise directly in international law, irrespective of 
nationality relations.  
The section below explains why. 
II.  INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTIVITY AND NATIONALITY 
The section above shows how the individual has “within a number of 
decades” evolved “from an illegitimate child to a well-accepted family 
member of international law.”148 It also showed that the journey has only 
just begun. In the words of German Professor Christian Tomuschat: 
“[t]he transformation from international law as a State-centered system 
to an individual-centred system has not yet found a definitive new equi-
librium. . . .”149 
 
146 Id. 
147 Gerhard Hafner, The Emancipation of the Individual from the State Under 
International Law, 358 RECUEIL DES COURS 275, 437–41 (2011). 
148 Andreas Th. Müller, Kate Parlett’s, The Individual in International Law, 23 EUR. J. 
INT’L. L 294, 299 (2012) (book review). 
149 Christian Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the 
Eve of a New Century: General Course on Public International Law, 281 RECUEIL DES COURS 
23, 161–62 (1999) (“[T]he international legal order cannot be understood any more 
as being based exclusively on State sovereignty. . . . States are no more than 
instruments whose inherent function is to serve the interests of their citizens as legally 
expressed in human rights. At the present time, it is by no means clear which one of 
the two rivalling Grundnorms will or should prevail in case of conflict. Over the last 
decades, a crawling process has taken place through which human rights have 
steadily increased their weight, gaining momentum in comparison with State 
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As mentioned above, one of the obstacles making it difficult for indi-
viduals to exercise their international rights is the lack of appropriate in-
ternational forums that give immediate access to exercise international 
rights and to receive remedies. While substantive thinking about rights of 
the individual has evolved at a confident pace, functionally, the interna-
tional legal system is still mostly constructed to respond and accommo-
date the rights of States. This means that while international substantive 
rights are increasingly given directly to individuals, individuals often have 
no immediate standing or any remedy available to access redress for vio-
lations of these rights. 
Oppenheim notes that “[n]ationality is the principal link between 
individuals and international law”150 and underlines that nationality is the 
“quality of being a subject of a certain state.”151 As the individual acquires 
subjectivity in international law and is emancipated from the State, the 
status of “being a subject of a certain state” to access international law 
needs rethinking. In the paragraphs below I explain why, and I argue 
against using nationality to provide standing and remedies to the indi-
vidual to assert individual international rights. 
Traditionally, as discussed in the first section of this Article, individ-
uals were not subjects of international law. States were the only subjects 
of international law, and individuals could only be objects of internation-
al law.152 The only link that individuals had with international law was 
through their nationalities. Nationality provided “a right of protection 
over nationals abroad which every state held and could assert against 
other states.” Indeed, in 1912 Oppenheim remarked that: 
If . . . individuals are never subjects but always objects of the Law 
of Nations, then nationality is the link between this law and indi-
viduals. It is through the medium of their nationality only that 
individuals can enjoy benefits from the existence of the Law of 
Nations.153 
Absent that nationality link, however, individuals had no access to inter-
national protection.154 The absence of nationality resulted in the absence 
of international protection.155 
 
sovereignty as a somewhat formal principle.”). 
150 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 21, § 379.  
151 Id. § 378.  
152 See generally Tomuschat, supra note 149, at 149. 
153 OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 291. 
154 See the excellent introduction by PARLETT, supra note 14, at 15. See also 
OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 291 (individuals that “do not possess any nationality enjoy 
no protection whatever, and if they are aggrieved by a State they have no way of 
redress, there being no State which would be competent to take their case in hand. 
As far as the Law of Nations is concerned, apart from morality, there is no restriction 
whatever to cause a State to abstain from maltreating to any extent such stateless 
individuals.”). 
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Gradually, the position of the individual has changed. There is now a 
recognition that States are the primary, but not the only, subjects of in-
ternational law. The individual has acquired some legal personality in in-
ternational law. Individuals have acquired a variety of international 
rights. Those rights derive from treaties, but also from international cus-
tom or from the UN Security Council. The individual has also acquired 
obligations and can commit international crimes for which she can be 
held responsible.156  
In certain cases, such as human rights, individuals may be able to ex-
ercise their rights directly in the international sphere.157 In other situa-
tions, such as in international investment law, the individual can enter 
into direct legal relations with a hosting State, but has no direct proce-
dural recourse.158 In those cases, to the extent that individuals are not 
considered direct subjects of international law, nationality provides a link 
between the individual and international law.159 It is through their na-
tionality that individuals are afforded direct representation in interna-
tional courts and tribunals.160 In fact, there is often a requirement to show 
a certain nationality before an individual can access international 
claims.161  
In sum, the position of the individual has evolved in such a way as to 
have created two different trajectories that are out-of-synch with each 
other. While the thinking and substantive rights of the individual have 
evolved at a sustained pace, the procedural aspects, and the individuals’ 
access to international law remedies, have not yet completely followed 
suit. Nationality has become a significant issue in this delay. A significant 
act that could precipitate changes in the system would be to provide ac-
cess to international claims to the individual through a mechanism that is 
detached from the State and hence is different from nationality. 
Historically, one of the functions of nationality has been the right of 
protection that States could assert against other States over their nation-
 
155 See G.A. Res. 896, at 49 (IX) (Dec. 4, 1954) (it was through this resolution that 
the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness was enacted. Statelessness is 
explored in detail below.). 
156 See supra Part I.  
157 Id.  
158 Id.  
159 PARLETT, supra note 14, at 28 (“To the extent that individuals are not subjects 
of international law, nationality is the link between individuals and international 
law. . . . If individuals who possess nationality are wronged abroad, as a rule, it is the 
state of nationality which has an exclusive right to ask for redress.”). See also generally 
id. at 26–29. 
160 F Orrego Vicuña, Individuals and Non-State Entities Before International Courts 
and Tribunals, in 5 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 56–57 (Jochen A. 
Frowein & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 5th ed. 2001). 
161 Id. at 59.  
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als travelling or living abroad and their property.162 Oliver Dörr explains 
that “[t]he legal authority of States with regard to their nationals extends 
to their relations with other States and allows them to make the rights 
and duties of their nationals a matter of their international relations.”163 
With the international legal changes related to the position of individuals 
discussed above, however, nationality has become, in certain situations, 
an obstacle that blocks direct access by the individual to the international 
legal sphere.164  
In truth, nationality requirements nowadays hinder an individual’s 
access to international law. Indeed, nationality has become the marking 
of State sovereignty over the individual—a notion that comes directly 
from the origin of nationality as “allegiance owned by the subject to his 
king.”165 Acknowledging the origins and social construct of nationality 
can have important implications and may help in thinking how to ad-
vance the position of the individual in international law.  
Nowhere are the contradictions of the nationality system more clear 
than in the plight of refugees.166 Refugees escape their country of origin 
because that country, rather than protecting them, abuses them. Indeed, 
refugees flee their country of origin because of a “well-founded fear of 
persecution.”167 The idea that the positions of the State and their nation-
als are always in synch is wrong and naïve.168 
The section that follows explores these questions further. It first ex-
plains how nationality is regulated by domestic law and the international 
law principles it must follow. The limits and weaknesses of linking indi-
 
162 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 21, § 379 (“This function of 
nationality becomes apparent with regard to individuals abroad, or to property 
abroad belonging to individuals who are themselves within the territory of their home  
state . . . .”).  
163 Oliver Dörr, Nationality, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 44 (Nov. 2006). 
164 OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 294; PARLETT, supra note 14, at 15.  
165 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 21, § 378. 
166 Paul Weis, The International Protection of Refugees, 48 AM. J. INT’L L. 193, 218 
(1954) (“The international protection of refugees purports to remedy the situation 
created by the fact that they lack the protection which is usually afforded to nationals 
abroad by the state of nationality. Like nationals abroad, refugees are aliens in the 
country of residence and subject to the territorial supremacy of the state of 
residence.”). 
167 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 51, at 152 (stating 
that “[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-
founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to return to it.”). 
168 See Weis, supra note 166, at 219. 
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vidual international subjectivity to nationality are explored next, from 
different angles; first, by highlighting how the present regulatory con-
struct has led to a misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the na-
tionality requirement in international dispute resolution settings, and 
then by exploring circumstances of stateless people and individuals with 
multiple nationalities.  
These analyses will set the scene for the final section of the Article, 
where I offer alternative solutions to using nationality to provide standing 
and remedies to the individual to assert individuals’ international rights. 
A. Nationality in International Law 
Nationality identifies and recognizes individuals under international 
law, and often provides them with rights and obligations.169 It is, at pre-
sent, central to the human experience in a global society.170 Malcolm 
Shaw writes that “[t]he link between the state and the individual for in-
ternational law purposes has historically been the concept of nationali-
ty.”171 As Paul Weis notes: 
The function of nationality in international law is usually de-
scribed as that of providing a link between the individual and 
the benefits of the Law of Nations. However, in international 
law, as at present constituted, nationality as a concept can only 
be defined by reference to the rights and duties of States. Na-
tionality, according to international law, is a specific relationship 
between an individual and a particular State which grants that 
State a right to permanent and unconditional protection of his 
person and property. . . .172 
It is a long-standing principle in international law that the acquisi-
tion of nationality is regulated by domestic law.173 Domestic law mandates 
how nationality is acquired and lost. This principle was explicitly recog-
nized by the PCIJ in the Nationality Decrees case.174 More recently, the Eu-
 
169 See generally Dörr, supra note 163, ¶ 44. 
170 AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL 
INEQUALITY ix–x (2009). 
171 SHAW, supra note 24, at 204; see also PARLETT, supra note 14, at 28. 
172 PAUL WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (1979). 
173 Herbert Hugh Naujoks, Power of the National State in International Law to 
Determine the Nationality of an Individual, 7 TEMP. L.Q. 176, 176 (1933). 
174 JAN ANNE VOS, THE FUNCTION OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (2013) (“[T]he 
question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is 
an essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of international 
relations. Thus, in the present state of international law, questions of nationality are, 
in the opinion of the Court, in principle within this reserved domain.”) (quoting 
Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J 
Rep. 1 (Feb 7)). See also Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflicts of 
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ropean Convention on Nationality also confirmed the validity of the 
principle, stating that “[e]ach State shall determine under its own law 
who are its nationals.”175 
There are different ways domestic law assigns nationality. At birth, 
nationality can be acquired based on where the person was born (jus so-
li)176 or based on the nationality of the parents (jus sanguinis).177 Often, 
domestic law applies a mix of both. For example, someone is a U.S. Na-
tional if she was born in the U.S., but also if she was born outside the U.S. 
from U.S. Nationals. After birth, domestic law also regulates how nation-
ality is acquired (“naturalization”). Naturalization can occur by marriage, 
residence, or by special reasons such as military service.178 
Historically, an issue of concern in assigning nationality was the 
avoidance of statelessness (i.e. the absence of nationality) due to territo-
rial changes.179 The nationality of women was also an issue, as under some 
domestic legislation, women lost their nationality when marrying a for-
eign national, and acquired the nationality of the spouse and risked los-
ing the new nationality if their spouse died, thus becoming stateless.180  
More recently, the issue of acquiring multiple nationalities has be-
come more of a concern.181 Overlapping nationalities are the by-product 
of a system based on domestic law, where an individual can be subject to 
more than one set of nationality laws, based on her family and on where 
she lives. Thus, both dual nationality and statelessness are issues that de-
rive from the freedom of the State to decide the matter of nationality in-
ternally.182  
International law plays a limited role in the regulation of nationali-
ty.183 The European Convention on Nationality provides that domestic 
nationality law “shall be accepted by other States in so far as it is con-
 
Nationality Laws, League of Nations Doc. C.224M.III. 1930 V (1930) [hereinafter 
Conflicts of Nationality] (“It is for each State to determine under its own law who are 
its nationals. This law shall be recognised by other States in so far as it is consistent 
with international convention, international custom, and the principles of law 
generally recognised with regard to nationality.”). 
175 European Convention on Nationality, art. 3, Nov. 6, 1997, E.T.S. 166. 
176 Jus soli, OXFORD REFERENCE (8th ed. 2015). 
177 Jus sanguinis, OXFORD REFERENCE (7th ed. 2009). 
178 See, e.g., Conflicts of Nationality, supra note 174 (“It is for each State to 
determine under its own law who are its nationals.”).  
179 Dörr, supra note 163, ¶ 16. 
180 See Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, Feb. 20, 1957, 309 
U.N.T.S. 65; European Convention on Nationality, supra note 175, at 3. 
181 See generally ALFRED M. BOLL, MULTIPLE NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
179–80 (2007). 
182 Dörr, supra note 163, ¶ 9. 
183 Id. ¶ 4 (“The most prominent feature of nationality under international law is 
that it is in principle no matter for international law, but for the domestic law of 
States.”). 
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sistent with applicable international conventions, customary international 
law and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nation-
ality.”184 
That said, international law may, to a certain extent, limit the discre-
tion in which States may determine nationality.185 Domestic legislation on 
nationality must follow non-discrimination principles, including on mat-
ters of sex, religion, race, and abilities.186 When a State regulates national-
ity, it must also obey by the general principle of State sovereignty, so that 
each State may only regulate the acquisition, loss, and events linked to 
nationality of its own nationals and not those of other States. Similarly, 
the State must refrain from intervening in another State’s domestic af-
fairs by regulating nationality in a manner that would interfere with an-
other State’s rights, for example, by naturalizing a large number of na-
tionals of another State.187 
B. The Limits of Nationality as a Mechanism for Individual’s Redress 
Above, I highlighted the origin of the state-centric principle of na-
tionality and explained how nationality is regulated. Nationality provides 
a link between individuals and international law when they do not enjoy 
direct rights under international law.188 How is this link activated? Essen-
tially in two ways: either directly by the State through a system of diplo-
matic protection, or by giving the individual herself direct access to in-
ternational remedies through treaties signed by the State that provide 
 
184 European Convention on Nationality, supra note 175, at 3. 
185 Dörr, supra note 163, ¶¶ 4, 17 (“International law limits that discretion [of 
determining nationality under domestic law], but it neither contains nor prescribes 
certain criteria for acquisition and loss of nationality. . . . Only a few limits are 
established in inter-national law to the freedom of States to confer their nationality; 
that is situations in which the conferment would not be recognized on the inter-
national plane. Such a situation is the naturalization ex lege of persons who are 
national of another State and who do not have any connections with the naturalizing 
State.”). 
186 European Convention on Nationality, supra note 175, art. 5 (stating “[t]he 
rules of a State Party on nationality shall not contain distinctions or include any 
practice which amount to discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion, race, colour 
or national or ethnic origin.”). 
187 Dörr, supra note 163, ¶ 4–5 (“the—scarce—rules of international law with 
respect to nationality mostly do not affect the legal validity of conferment of 
nationality under international law, but simply its acceptance on the international 
plane, ie [sic] the consequences of nationality vis-à-vis other States.”). Dörr also notes 
that International law may have more to say in relation to the acceptance of the 
assignment of nationality in the international plane and the consequences of the 
assignment of nationality in relations to other states. 
188 Walter, supra note 9, ¶ 18. 
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access to forums based on nationality requirements.189 Each situation is 
explained in turn below. 
Under diplomatic protection, a State can bring a claim that belongs 
to one of its nationals via a system of diplomatic espousal in front of an 
international tribunal and against the State that wronged the national. 
Diplomatic protection is “an extraordinary legal remedy”190 and “is well 
established in customary international law.”191 By espousing a claim of its 
national, the State is taking the claim as its own. The assumption is that 
by injuring a national, the State itself has been injured. Vattel phrased it 
thus: 
Whoever uses a citizen ill, indirectly offense the state, which is 
bound to protect this citizen; and the sovereign of the latter 
should avenge his wrongs, punish the aggressor, and, if possible, 
oblige him to make full reparation; since otherwise the citizen 
would not obtain the great end of the civil association, which is 
safety.192 
Thus, diplomatic protection is aimed at strengthening the bond between 
the State and the national and not necessarily aimed at providing a rem-
edy for violating an international right to the individual. Under diplo-
matic protection, the claim is the claim of the State, not the individual. 
Any compensation awarded to the State is given to the State, not to the 
individual, as compensation for any damage the State received to its rep-
utation. Through diplomatic protection “individuals were mediated in 
international law by the States involved in their treatment in a specific 
situation and had no legal position of their own.”193  
The limitations of using diplomatic protection for individuals’ inter-
national claims are many. First, espousing an individual’s claim is discre-
tionary as the individual must acquire the attention and the support of 
 
189 See SHAW, supra note 24, at 612 (“Nationality is the link between the individual 
and his or her state as regards particular benefits and obligations. It is also the vital 
link between the individual and the benefits of international law. Although 
international law is now moving to a stage whereby individuals may require rights free 
from the interposition of the state, the basic proposition remains that in a state-
oriented world system, it is only through the medium of the state that the individual 
may obtain the full range of benefits under international law, and nationality is the 
key. The principle of diplomatic protection originally developed in the context of the 
state by foreign nationals.”). 
190 Weis, supra note 166, at 219 (“The diplomatic protection of nationals in an 
extraordinary legal remedy, in the exercise of which the state may resort to all the 
methods at its disposal for the enforcement of rights under international law.”). 
191 Id. at 219. 
192 PARLETT, supra note 14, at 49 (quoting E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or, 
Principles of Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and 
Sovereigns). 
193 Walter, supra note 9, ¶15. 
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the State.194 The State may, moreover, have different priorities and inter-
ests from the individual, or simply not value the claim. Diplomatic pro-
tection claims are also generally costly, both in terms of reputation and 
actual financial cost. The State must weigh all its diverse interests before 
going forward and may decide that it is not worth filing a claim against 
another sovereign. This decision could leave the individual with no rem-
edy. And international law and international courts that apply it seem to 
be unfazed by the lack of remedies this situation produces. A recent ICJ 
decision is telling in this regard. In Jurisdictional Immunities,195 Germany 
filed a case against Italy concerning the extent of its immunity to certain 
decisions by Italian courts. The case related to claims brought by Italian 
victims of Nazi-era war crimes against Germany in Italian courts. The sub-
stance of the facts was not disputed by Germany, but Germany claimed 
that a number of international agreements had either waived claims for 
compensation or already provided compensation. Germany had also en-
acted domestic laws to compensate victims of Nazi-era atrocities. Despite 
this, the Italian nationals who had sought compensation from Germany 
in Italian courts had not received any. Italian courts ruled in favor of the 
individuals, and Germany claimed at the ICJ that these rulings violated its 
State immunity. The ICJ sided with Germany and claimed that: 
102. Where the State receiving funds as part of what was intend-
ed as a comprehensive settlement in the aftermath of an armed 
conflict has elected to use those funds to rebuild its national 
economy and infrastructure, rather than distributing them to 
individual victims amongst its nationals, it is difficult to see why the 
fact that those individuals had not received a share in the money should 
be a reason for entitling them to claim against the State that had trans-
ferred money to their State of nationality. 
[…] 
104. In coming to this conclusion, the Court is not unaware that 
the immunity from jurisdiction of Germany in accordance with 
international law may preclude judicial redress for the Italian 
nationals concerned.196  
 
194 Weis, supra note 166, at 219 (“Diplomatic protection of citizens purports to 
present the violation of the citizens’ rights, or to secure redress for effected violation. 
In asserting this protection, the state does not represent the individual citizen who 
has suffered injury to his rights, but, at least according to the traditional theory, gives 
effect to its own rights which have been violated in the person of its subject. The state 
has, according to international law, no duty to exercise this protection, and a national 
has no rights to demand protection . . . .”). 
195 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), 
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143, 2 (Feb. 3). 
196 Id. ¶¶ 102, 104 (emphasis added).  
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This decision truly encapsulates what is wrong with the present sys-
tem which bases international individual claims on nationality. It also de-
livers support for an alternative approach to give direct access to interna-
tional remedies for individuals. First, the decision offers a clear example 
of a conflict of interest between the interest of the individual in compen-
sation and the State. Specifically, in the instant case, Italy had received 
compensation from Germany, but that compensation had not reached 
the individuals. Italy and Italian nationals clearly had different interests, 
and Italy may not have acted in the best interest of its nationals. 
Indeed, the decision of the ICJ also clearly shows the limit encoun-
tered by individuals seeking redress. Italian nationals sought compensa-
tion for war crimes committed by Germany. The ICJ applied today’s legal 
provisions, and the result was the preclusion of any actions of redress by 
the individuals. Indeed, the Court was aware that its decision would pre-
clude judicial redress to the Italian nationals. The Court was unmoved by 
the situation. It even stated that “it is difficult to see” why the fact that in-
dividuals were not compensated should give individuals access to alterna-
tive forms of remedies. That the ICJ failed to see the importance of the 
repercussions is telling and underscores the need to move beyond claims 
based on nationality and instead create a new system that looks beyond 
nationality to give standing and access to international remedies directly 
to the individual.197 
In sum, diplomatic protection is generally not an effective way to 
provide direct remedies to individuals for international law violations – 
there is no guarantee of action by the State, and conflicts of interest be-
tween the State and the individual abound. 198 
A second way in which nationality is relevant for individual claims is 
in situations where treaty provisions allow an individual of the treaty-
signatory State to bring an international claim against another Signatory-
State in an international forum in support of the individual’s own claim. 
 
197 Ingrid Wuerth, ICJ Issues Jurisdictional Immunities Judgement, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 
7, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/02/07/icj-issues-jurisdictional-immunities-
judgment/. 
198 There is one exception to this: claims for wrongs to individuals in situations 
where the individual truly acts on behalf of the State. i.e. in cases of violations of 
diplomatic or consular rights. In these cases, the individual officially represented the 
State. Therefore, bringing claims through diplomatic protection is the correct way to 
proceed. See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 128. Article 38 of the Vienna 
Convention offers privileges and immunities only to members of a diplomatic mission 
who are nationals of the sending State. Vienna Convention, supra note 128. Similarly 
Art. 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations includes of communication 
and contact with nationals of the sending State. 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, supra note 129. See also John Dugard, Article on Diplomatic Protection 2006, U. 
N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L. 8 (2006), http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/adp/adp.html; 
David Leys, Diplomatic Protection and Individual Rights: A Complementary Approach, 57 
HARV. INT’L. L.J. (ONLINE) 1, 4–5 (2015). 
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In these cases, individuals acquire procedural rights to seek remedy for 
violations of their international rights through their nationality, because 
a certain forum is open to them thanks to their nationality. In the matter 
of treaty law, “nationality is an essential element in bringing individuals 
under the personal scope of certain treaties.”199 This method is how most 
individuals acquire standing and remedies for their international law 
claims in international forums. 
Though this mechanism seems appealing in theory because it pro-
vides access to international legal remedies to individuals, in practice it is 
not. First, these claims are individual claims. There is no theoretical ne-
cessity to attach a nationality requirement for the individual to access in-
ternational remedies. The claim originates from rights that are rights of 
the individual, and are not rights of the State. For example, the mini-
mum standard of treatment is an individual right that every foreigner is 
entitled to when they engage in business in another country or when they 
reside in another country.200 It is not necessarily linked to a particular na-
tionality, but to the status of being a foreigner. Similarly, provisions 
against illegal expropriation create an individual right which provides a 
protection for the foreign investor; the State of nationality of the investor 
is not relevant for the individual claim.201  
Yet, the individual can only acquire standing and access to interna-
tional remedies through her nationality, even if that right derives from 
customary law (as it is the case for claims of expropriation and minimum 
standard of treatment). Today, access to international remedies is part of 
the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral treaties, which may render 
the right actionable. When State A negotiates a treaty with State B, part of 
the negotiation by State A can concern granting access to nationals of 
State B to an international forum for claims of violation of the treaty by 
State A. State B will then grant the same rights to nationals of State A. 
While this happens in practice, there is no compelling reason for contin-
uing to include such nationality-related provisions in treaties. One can 
envisage, as will be argued below, a different system where procedural ac-
cess is not based on nationality.202 Rights could become actionable based 
on many other issues. This novel approach would align doctrinal devel-
opment with functional requirements and it will also be responsive to the 
needs of individuals and will allow many more international claims to be 
brought in international forums. 
 
199 Dörr, supra note 163, ¶ 46. 
200 OECD (2004), “Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International 
Investment Law”, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2004/03, OECD 
Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/675702255435. 
201 See generally Secretary-General of UNCTAD, Expropriation, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7 (July 2012). 
202 See infra Part III. 
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Moreover, as explained in the next sections below, the principle of 
linking a procedural nationality requirement to the substantive interna-
tional rights of individuals is wanting for practical reasons. First, the way 
it is applied results in a review of domestic legislation that often second-
guesses States’ actions and further limits access of the individual to inter-
national remedies. Second, because some international tribunals have 
interpreted the nationality requirement by adding a “dominant and ef-
fective” nationality test, the norms applicable to dual nationals are un-
clear, and are becoming outdated and non-responsive to today’s global-
ized world. Third, by making nationality a procedural requirement for 
remedy access, stateless individuals and other possible holders of merito-
rious claims are excluded. Each of these criticisms are explained below. 
1. The Downside of Second-Guessing States 
The first argument that undermines using nationality as a link for 
individuals to access international law remedies is that international tri-
bunals routinely second-guess States’ nationality legislation when they in-
itially review the case for their jurisdiction. In fact, once acquired, na-
tionality is reviewed and ‘validated’ in the international sphere in cases 
where the individual seeks to access specific procedural remedies. Even 
though nationality is regulated domestically, international courts and tri-
bunals retain the right to review issues of nationality to establish jurisdic-
tion, and this includes issues of nationality of convenience or “effective 
nationality.” International courts and tribunals can disregard the claim of 
an individual or even a State in relation to a nationality.  
This review by international courts and tribunals of domestic legisla-
tion on nationality has resulted in several misapplications of the national-
ity principle. Indeed, international courts and tribunals have shown a 
willingness to review domestic law and disregard the claim of an individ-
ual or even the relevant State in relation to a nationality. Several deci-
sions pertaining to international investment law are telling. 
For example, in Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates, an international in-
vestment tribunal denied jurisdiction to the claimant investor for failing 
to satisfy the nationality requirements, notwithstanding the fact that the 
claimant’s Italian nationality was supported by several nationality certifi-
cates issued by several Italian public authorities. The Tribunal concluded 
that, despite the nationality certificates (and unbeknownst to the claim-
ant), the claimant had lost his Italian nationality.203 As a result, the claim 
 
203 Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7, Decision on the 
Application for Annulment and Separate opinion, ¶ 133 (June 5, 2007). (Mr Soufraki 
filed a Request for Arbitration against the UAE at ICSID in 2002. In it he sought to 
invoke the protection afforded by the UAE to Italian citizens under the 1997 UAE-
Italy bilateral investment treaty. The case related to a Concession Contract with the 
Dubai Department of Ports and Customs, which Mr Soufraki entered into in 2000. In 
support of his claim to be an Italian national Mr. Soufraki produced two Italian 
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by Mr. Soufraki was not heard by the Tribunal, and Mr. Soufraki had no 
redress against the United Arab Emirates. 
Similarly, in Siag v. Egypt, another international investment tribunal 
found Egypt liable to Mr. Siag and Mrs. Vecchi for damages they had suf-
fered.204 The Tribunal found that Egypt violated numerous provisions of 
the Italy-Egypt bilateral investment treaty (BIT). Claimants were both 
natural citizens of Italy and the principal investors in two Egyptian corpo-
rations. They alleged that Egypt had expropriated their investment un-
lawfully. Egypt rejected the claim and asserted that Claimants were at all 
relevant times nationals of Egypt, and therefore could not bring a claim 
against Egypt under the Italy-Egypt BIT. Egypt also argued that the 
claimants could not deny their Egyptian nationalities, because they had 
relied on it in the past to acquire and use Egyptian passports and con-
clude business deals. These facts were not contested by claimants. The 
majority of the tribunal, however, dismissed the objections put forth by 
Egypt, and instead concluded that the claimants had “acted in good faith 
in obtaining their Egyptian passports and in their subsequent business 
and other dealings with Egypt.” The claimants “did not know at that 
point, nor as lay persons could they reasonably be expected to have 
known, that in law they had legally lost their Egyptian nationality. Thus, 
the claimants are not estopped from now denying their Egyptian nation-
ality.”205 In this case, it was the State that suffered from a misapplication 
of domestic nationality law. The Tribunal found it had jurisdiction in a 
situation in which Egypt thought its nationals were involved, and thus was 
not an international claim. 
These cases are significant because they show that international tri-
bunals will review and second-guess a State’s nationality legislation, both 
in terms of finding jurisdiction when the State argues none is to be 
found, and in terms of denying jurisdiction even if the State has provided 
certification of nationality.  
 
passports, five Certificates of Italian nationality issued by Italian authorities and a 
letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy confirming his right to have 
recourse to the BIT on the basis of his Italian citizenship. The UAE, however, rejected 
Mr. Soufraki’s claims to be an Italian national. The UAE objected that in 1991 Mr. 
Soufraki had acquired Canadian nationality without taking the steps necessary under 
Italian law to preserve his Italian nationality, with the result that he lost his Italian 
nationality in 1991 and was not therefore a national of Italy at the relevant times 
necessary under ICSID. The Tribunal remarked that “had Mr. Soufraki contracted 
with the United Arab Emirates through a corporate vehicle incorporated in Italy, 
rather than contracting in his personal capacity, no problem of jurisdiction would 
now arise. But the Tribunal can only take the facts as they are and as it has found 
them to be.”). 
204 Siag v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB 05/15, Resort 
development, ¶ 631(V)-(VI) (June 1, 2009). 
205 Siag v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Resort 
development, ¶ 483 (June 1, 2009). 
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In sum, the present system creates an obvious tension. On one side, 
States decide how to grant nationality. On the other, international tribu-
nals can review that decision and deny access to remedy independently. 
This puts individuals in a weak position, as the link that gives them access 
to international law is subject to review by an international tribunal. It al-
so undermines the State, as international tribunals can disregard nation-
ality certificates and declarations by States.  
Reviewing domestic legislation and second-guessing States on mat-
ters of nationality can undermine an individual’s access to international 
remedies. They also provide support for a new system not based on na-
tionality links, in order to grant procedural rights to individuals in mat-
ters of international claims by the individuals. I offer suggestions on pos-
sible systemic changes in the last part of this Article. 
2. The Limits of the “Dominant & Effective Nationality” Rule: Dual 
Nationals and the Paradox of Nottebohm 
A second flaw of a system that bases an individual’s access to interna-
tional claims on nationality is the requirement that a nationality must be 
the “dominant and effective” nationality in order for it to grant access to 
international remedies.  
The rule derives from the ICJ Nottebohm decision.206 The case relates 
to the vicissitudes of Mr. Nottebohm, a German national born in 1881. 
Mr. Nottebohm lived in Guatemala from 1905 until 1943, but never be-
came a citizen of Guatemala. In 1939, at the beginning of the Second 
World War, he applied to become a naturalized citizen of Liechtenstein. 
The application was approved in an expedited manner, and following the 
payment of a sum of money in taxation to Liechtenstein. He then re-
turned to Guatemala on his Liechtensteiner passport, and informed Gua-
temala of his change of nationality. He traveled and returned to Guate-
mala again in 1943, after Guatemala’s entry into World War II, but was 
refused entry as an enemy alien due to his German nationality. Not-
tenbohm’s property was confiscated and he was extradited to the U.S. to 
an internment camp. After World War II ended, Mr. Nottebohm moved 
back to Liechtenstein. In 1951, Liechtenstein brought a case on behalf of 
Mr. Nottebohm against Guatemala for unjust enrichment and sought re-
dress. Guatemala, however, argued that Mr. Nottenhom was not a na-
tional of Liechtenstein under international law. The Court agreed, and 
found it had no jurisdiction to entertain the case. This is surprising—and 
wrong—for several reasons.207 Mr. Nottebohm lost his German nationality 
and only had his Liechtensteiner nationality. By precluding access to the 
 
206 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. 111 (Nov. 18). 
207 See the excellent article by Professor Slone criticizing the ICJ decision: Robert 
D. Slone, Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary International Legal Regulation of 
Nationality, 50 HARV. J. INT’L L.J. 1, 1–3 (2009).  
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ICJ because his nationality “was not genuine,” Mr. Nottebohm in effect 
lost his capacity to access international remedies.208  
By so doing, the ICJ essentially added a new requirement to diplo-
matic espousal, which created “different classes of nationals: those having 
acquired their nationality by birth or change of civil status, and those hav-
ing been naturalized.”209 The decision makes it even harder for individu-
als to bring their claims and again signals the need for a new system of 
individual remedies. 
The effective nationality principle is mostly applied in cases of dual 
nationality, which is where the principle actually originated,210 to deter-
mine which nationality should be used in a given case.211 In fact, it was the 
decision in Nottebohm that was followed by the Iran–U.S. Claims Tribunal 
(IUSTC) in deciding claims brought by U.S. nationals against Iran and 
Iranian nationals against the U.S. The Tribunal decided that, for jurisdic-
tional purposes, a dual U.S.-Iranian national would be considered the na-
tional of his or her “dominant and effective nationality” in the period be-
tween the formation of the claim and the date of the establishment of the 
Tribunal.212 To assess the “dominant and effective nationality,” the Tri-
bunal reviews “all relevant factors, including habitual residence, center of 
interests, family ties, participation in public life and other evidence of at-
tachment.”213 However, this is not an easy task, and it is a subjective analy-
sis. Moreover, with the rising number of dual nationals,214 the principle of 
effective and dominant nationality is becoming increasingly obsolete.215 
With globalization and intensified travel by many people, including dual 
nationals—which nationality is “real and effective” may not be obvious.216 
 
208 See Dörr, supra note 163, ¶ 54 (the Court “deprived the individual of the 
advantages of nationality in relation to other States and thereby rendered him de 
facto stateless”). 
209 Id. ¶ 54. 
210 See generally Nottebohm, supra note 206. 
211 For dual nationality, see generally, Donner, supra note 11, at 16. 
212 Iran v. United States of America, Case No. A/18 5 Iran–US Cl. Trib. Rep. 251, 
Concerning the Question of Jurisdiction Over Claims of Persons with Dual 
Nationality, ¶ 10 (Apr. 6, 1984). 
213 Id. ¶ 21. 
214 Jason Schacter, Dual Citizenship Trends and Their Implication or the Collection of 
Migration Statistics, UNECE (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/ 
DAM/stats/documents/ece/ces/ge.10/2014/mtg1/presentations/10._UNECE_Dual
_citizenship.pdf (noting a rapidly growing trend across many countries; dual 
nationals in Spain grew 5x between 2002 and 2014). 
215 WEIS, supra note 172, at 239 (“Nationality, in the sense of membership of a 
State, the ‘belonging’ of an individual to a State, presupposes the co-existence of 
States. Nationality is, therefore, a concept not only of municipal law but also of 
international law. As a concept of municipal law it is defined by municipal law; as a 
concept of international law it is defined by international law.”). 
216 See Donner, supra note 11, at 25 (“Further, the International Law Commission 
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It is very possible that a person splits her time among several places for 
which she has nationality, none of which is more effective than others. 
Similarly, globalization may also result in disseminated centers of inter-
ests, where one person may work in State A, have a family in State B and 
frequently travel to State C. When the person is also a national of State A, 
B, and C, which is the “real and effective” nationality? 
In sum, the “effective and dominant” nationality principle can arbi-
trarily deprive single nationality holders of the possibility of bringing a 
claim and finding a remedy under international law. For dual nationals, 
it adds a layer of difficulties that is becoming increasingly anachronistic. 
3. Other Limitations of Nationality: Refugees and Stateless Individuals 
This Article argues to reject nationality-based international claims for 
individuals for another reason: the fact that such a mechanism precludes 
access by individuals who are stateless and thus have no nationality. 
At present, an estimated 15 million people are stateless, and are thus 
not protected by any nationality.217 Statelessness can occur for many rea-
sons. There are some “technical” causes, such as the application of mutu-
al domestic provisions relating to jus sanguinis and jus soli, marriage, di-
vorce, and adoption, which result in no nationality being given. States at 
times also arbitrarily deprive individuals of nationality, for example, as a 
consequence of hostilities.218 Statelessness can also be a consequence of 
 
had by August 2004 produced one Preliminary and five consequent numbered 
Reports on Diplomatic Protection. . . . Art. 6 of the First Report, of 7 March 2000, 
states: ‘Subject to Art. 9, paragraph 4, the State of nationality may exercise diplomatic 
protection on behalf of an injured national against a State of which the injured 
person is also a national where the individual’s [dominant and effective] nationality is 
that of the former State.”). 
217 Vincent Chetail, Laura Van Waas’s: Nationality Matters - Statelessness Under 
International Law’, 28 REFUGEE SURVEY Q. 236, 236 (2009). 
218 In Art. 5(1) of its Statute, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission 
[hereinafter EECC] was tasked with deciding the claims of nationals of one party 
against the Government of the other party. G.A. Res. A/55/686, annex, Agreement 
Between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, ¶5(1) (Dec. 13, 2000). Still, Art. 5(9) provided that, 
“[i]n appropriate cases, each party may file claims on behalf of persons of Ethiopian 
or Eritrean origin who may not be its nationals. Such claims shall be considered by 
the Commission on the same basis as claims submitted on behalf of that party’s 
nationals.” Id. art. 5(9). For historical reasons there were a large number of dual 
Eritrean and Ethiopian nationals. The wrongful deprivation of nationality was a core 
claim made by Eritrea against Ethiopia. In an important decision, the EECC 
recognized the continued force of the rule of dominant and effective nationality in 
many circumstances. Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 
505, 586-87 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009). (“However, it believe[d] that application of the 
rule must be qualified in situations, such as those presented here, involving claims 
centered on expulsion or deprivation of nationality by the respondent State. It 
cannot be that, in such situations, international law allows a State wrongfully to expel 
persons or deprive them of its own nationality, but then deny State responsibility 
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State succession.219 Van Waas also identifies the “new” causes of stateless-
ness, and namely irregular migration and deficiencies of the registration 
of births and marriages.220 
Whatever the cause, statelessness has serious repercussions on the 
lives of individuals.221 Stateless individuals lack remedies when they have a 
claim under international law because they have no nationality that can 
“attach” to the claim.222 Statelessness also puts a strong spotlight on the 
unnecessary and unjust nature of the present international legal system 
based on nationality. Indeed, the present system is anomalous: direct in-
ternational rights are given to the individual. However, individuals too 
often lack the procedural means to exercise their rights. 
In the section above, I offer three reasons why the present system is 
unjust and unhelpful. First, nationality provisions are reviewed by inter-
national courts and tribunals and this review can result in second-
guessing States’ domestic provisions and barring access to individuals. 
Second, the application of the ICJ Nottebohm test may prevent nationals 
from accessing international courts and is unhelpful to identify claims by 
dual nationals. Finally, the present system does not give voice to anyone 
who, for no fault of her own, lacks a nationality all together.  
But most of all, a nationality-based system does not keep up with the 
recent doctrinal changes in international law. As individuals acquire legal 
personality, what is important is the content of the rights and the kind of 
violation individuals suffered, not their nationality.  
Nationality is no panacea for individuals. Nationality too often does 
not grant access to the individual to an effective international remedy. In 
the section below, I will suggest alternative ways to give individuals access, 
and expedite the development of a more representative international law 
system. 
 
because of the very social connections or bonds of nationality it wrongfully ended.”) 
(Citing Art. 5(9), the EECC then concluded that the provision was a “compelling 
indication that the Parties did not view the general rules of diplomatic protection as 
applying in the unusual circumstances that led to that Agreement.”). Thus, the EECC 
made awards in favor of Eritrea for “dual nationals who were arbitrarily deprived of 
their Ethiopian nationality while present in third countries” Id. at 590, ¶ 267 and for 
the wrongful expulsion of “dual nationals by local Ethiopian authorities.” Id. at 598, ¶ 
302.  
219 LAURA VAN WAAS, NATIONALITY MATTERS—STATELESSNESS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 123 (2008). 
220 See generally id. at 121–92. 
221 WEIS, supra note 172, at 166. 
222 ERIC FRIPP, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
REFUGEE STATUS 95 (2016). The case of the Palestinians is emblematic in this respect. 
Palestinians have no nationality of their own, and often enjoy nationality from other 
States in the region. Lacking a Palestinian nationality makes it difficult, at the 
moment, to compensate claims for damages. See Abbas Shiblak, Stateless Palestinians, 
26 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 8, 8–9 (2006). 
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III.  RETHINKING THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW—
BEYOND NATIONALITY? 
In the sections above, I first discussed how the individual gradually 
acquired a substantial amount of rights and obligations in international 
law. I then noted that, in terms of procedure, individuals’ venues for en-
forcing international rights remain limited. I highlighted that in most ar-
eas, access to remedies is only available if the individual, in addition to 
the claim based on an international legal right, has a certain nationality 
that allows her into specific international forums. 
However, recognizing claims by an individual in international law 
based on her nationality has often proven wanting. Nationality claims are 
not always correctly resolved by international courts and tribunals. Glob-
alization has also brought to bear the fallacies and limitations of a policy 
centered on the relation with one State: how are claims of dual or multi-
ple nationals to be reviewed? Nationality-based claims also leave out of 
the system an entire category of claimants—those who do not have a na-
tionality. This Article argues that the present system—where individuals’ 
international claims are based on nationality—needs rethinking. Indeed, 
severing the nationality requirement will allow the individual to play a 
more distinct, direct and independent role in international law. 
In order to address the lack of procedural rights, and grant the indi-
vidual access to international remedies for her international law claims, a 
new approach is required—an approach based on an alternative under-
standing of the characteristics that identify individuals’ claims under in-
ternational law. Truly, we need to rethink the individual in international 
law. Only a new approach to international procedural rights would ade-
quately respond to the gradually recognized idea that the individual is a 
separate subject of international law. As Gorski asserts: 
Sovereignty could no longer blind the view of the individual. 
Both the rise of international humanitarian law and, in particu-
lar, of human rights law showed an increased intent of the in-
ternational system to grant rights directly to individuals. Doctri-
nally, this change in State practice was legally accommodated by 
showing a more flexible approach towards the concept of sub-
jects of international law.223 
The next step in this evolution is improving procedures to grant in-
dividual access to international courts. In Reparation, the ICJ clarified that 
“subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their 
nature or in the extent of their rights.”224 Indeed, the evolution of inter-
national law concerning its subjects, and especially individuals, “requires 
 
223 Gorski, supra note 7, ¶ 15. 
224 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion, supra note 36, at 178. 
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laying more emphasis on differences in the capacity to act.”225 So, when 
this Article suggests thinking about providing individuals with procedural 
access for their international claims, it is not arguing for the individuals 
to become like States. There are obvious differences. The thinking must 
be differentiated and more refined. The individual must find a new and 
proper role in international law. This role will be unique. 
At the outset, it is exciting to reflect on how the recent proliferation 
of international courts and tribunals has shown that personal jurisdiction 
can be based on multiple kinds of actors and subject-matters. Indeed, the 
multiplication of international courts and tribunals has been instrumen-
tal—and thus an enabling factor—in generating new thinking about sub-
jects in international proceedings. As new actors intervening in the set-
tled business of international adjudication, international courts and 
tribunals have altered the equilibrium that existed before, and their es-
tablishment and practice has fostered the creation of newer venues for 
recourse.  
Traditionally, international adjudication was focused on inter-State 
disputes, which were heard by the PCIJ (and later the ICJ), or by interna-
tional arbitral tribunals and claims commissions. The evolution of the 
subject matter jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals has been 
substantial. International courts and tribunals that hear claims concern-
ing subjects other than States thrive. The European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), for example, hears cases brought by individuals against 
States for violations of human rights law.226 Arbitral tribunals applying the 
International Convention for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
have jurisdiction over disputes brought by international individuals and 
companies against States hosting their investments.227 The ICC, ICTY and 
ICTR all have jurisdiction over individuals regarding violations of inter-
national criminal law.228 
The creation of these new international forums has enabled and 
stimulated the theoretical consideration of a wider and more diverse ty-
pology of claimants, and thus, by association, could also foster and enable 
a new thinking on how to grant access to a wider range of individuals to 
international forums that can hear individual international law claims. In 
 
225 Walter, supra note 9, ¶ 29. 
226 See generally ECHR, supra note 75. 
227 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States art. 25, March 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 174 [hereinafter 
ICSID Convention] (“(1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal 
dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any 
constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by 
that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the 
dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their 
consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.”). 
228 See supra Part I(c). 
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sum, the practice of international courts and tribunals can serve as an in-
structive blueprint to a new thinking about how to grant access to indi-
viduals for their international claims.  
Currently, when individuals can bring cases directly in international 
courts and tribunals, these forums generally have jurisdictional require-
ments based on nationality.229 Access to forums based on nationality is 
usually negotiated by States in the relevant treaties that create the forum 
or substantive right. This is now part of the quid-pro-quo of international 
negotiations.230 It does not need to be this way. Indeed, a rethinking is 
necessary. As Müller remarks: 
If contemporary international legal science seeks to give the in-
dividual its proper place in the international legal system, if it 
wants conceptually to incorporate the individual as a hitherto 
widely alien factor, subject and actor in international law, it must 
be prepared to look for the reflections of the undisputed rise of 
the individual on the level of positive law in the mirror of our 
theorizing on international law.231 
Some relevant alternative examples exist. They are explored below. The 
ICJ also clearly confirmed that the development of international law 
adapts to the needs it faces. It stated: 
Throughout its history, the development of international law has 
been influenced by the requirements of international life, and 
the progressive increase in the collective activities of States has 
already given rise to instances of action upon the international 
plane by certain entities which are not States.232 
Today, “international life” (in this case—the present doctrinal under-
standing of rights and obligations of the individual internationally) re-
quires a new development in international law.  
As international law stands now, individuals are endowed with some 
legal personality, but are precluded from fully exercising their claims by 
the lack of procedural rights.233 The present system is often based on na-
tionality. Instead of empowering the individual, however, nationality has 
often become an obstacle that blocks the individual from acquiring an 
international legal personality. The difference between subjective and 
procedural rights highlights the discrepancy between theory and reality. 
This discrepancy—and how to close it—is addressed in this Section. 
 
229 See, e.g., ICSID Convention, supra note 227, at 174.  
230 See supra Part II(b). 
231 Müller, supra note 148, at 299. 
232 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion, supra note 36, at 178. 
233 Id. at 179.  
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In her analysis of the doctrine of subjects, former ICJ President 
Rosalyn Higgins specifically noted the difficulty of adapting the doctrine 
of subjects to a variety of subjects. She stated: “We have erected an intel-
lectual prison of our own choosing and then declared it to be an unalter-
able constraint.”234 
It is time to re-think this intellectual prison and adapt the doctrine of 
subjects to reflect reality. More specifically, it is time to rethink the gap 
that exists between the theory that accepts the individual as the holder of 
international rights and obligations, and the practice that does not allow 
the individual to fully exercise those rights. 
The following Sections will examine how this change can be effectu-
ated and will give some illustrations on how the new theory can be ap-
plied in practice. 
A. How It Can Be Done 
Having determined that there is a need to change the way individu-
als are able to access international remedies, this Section assesses two 
ways that can provide the basis for international claims not based on na-
tionality. 
As a preliminary matter, it is useful to think about the common fea-
tures shared by the individual claims considered in this Article. First, the 
right that is the object of the claim is an international right that belongs 
to the individual. It is a right of the individual qua individual, and not a 
right of the individual as representative of a State. For example, it is a 
right that guarantees a protection to the individual, for example to enjoy 
family life or to own property.235 It is not a right the individual has on be-
half of the State, such as a diplomatic claim arising from the fact that the 
individual serves, for example, as the Ambassador of a certain State.236 Al-
so, the claim is a claim asserted for a violation that the individual suf-
fered, not the State. For example, if an individual’s property is arbitrarily 
expropriated, it is the individual qua individual and owner of the proper-
ty who suffered, not the State. The State of nationality of the expropriat-
ed individual has no personal claim. Finally, the remedy requested is a 
remedy for the individual. Monetary compensation or just satisfaction are 
awarded directly to individuals for damages that they suffered directly.237 
The award does not compensate for any damages—not even reputation-
al—suffered by the State. 
 
234 HIGGINS, supra note 60, at 49.  
235 ECHR, supra note 75, art. 8. See also id. art. 1. 
236 See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 128, art. 38. 
237 See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 75, art. 41 (“If the Court finds that there has been a 
violation of the Convention or the protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the 
High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the 
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”).  
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In sum, the common features of these types of claims clearly estab-
lish that these claims belong to the individual, regardless of her State of 
nationality. Although individuals often get access and redress for their 
claims thanks to their nationality (because access is given by treaty) there 
is nothing necessarily and intrinsically linked to the State of nationality as 
to the substance and content of the claim. 
It follows that de-linking individuals’ international claims procedures 
from their nationality, and giving them another base to establish jurisdic-
tion will go a long way to address the lack of access to international rem-
edies for the individual, and it will be an important first step in establish-
ing a new system of international relations, where the individual is 
recognized as playing a more relevant and diverse role.  
1. An Alternative Base for Jurisdiction 
Dörr points out that nationality has become irrelevant in the area of 
human rights because “under human rights law the individual is ad-
dressed and protected as a human being and not as the national of a 
State.”238 This is an important consideration and offers much food for 
thought. As explained in Section I above, human rights provisions are 
given to individuals as such, and protect the individuals from adverse 
States’ actions.239  
Importantly, human rights protections are not limited to substantive 
rights. Under certain systems, and notably the ECtHR, they are extended 
procedurally as well. Protocol 11 ECHR, which entered into force on No-
vember 1, 1998, provides the strongest direct enforceability instrument 
for individuals. Protocol 11 allows for the right of individual petitions and 
makes the jurisdiction of the permanent European Court of Human 
Rights for cases against all the States Parties to the Council of Europe 
compulsory.240 This is a very significant and unique instrument.241 Provid-
ed certain requirements are fulfilled, the individual may have direct ac-
cess to international remedies. 242  
 
238 Dörr, supra note 163, ¶ 3 (asserting that “[i]t was only with the development 
of the international protection of human rights, and it still is only for the purposes of 
that area of international law, that nationality as core of the individual’s status 
became irrelevant, since under human rights law the individual is addressed and 
protected as a human being, not as a national of a State.”).  
239 See supra Part I(c). 
240 Protocol No. 11, supra note 84, arts 32, 34. 
241 See Reisman, supra note 61, at 873 (arguing the international law of human 
rights renders much of the pre-existing international law anachronistic). 
242 ECHR, supra note 75, art. 35 (“The Court may only deal with the matter after 
all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised 
rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which 
the final decision was taken.”). 
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The Court has had enormous success in practice. 243 The caseload of 
the ECtHR is significant. Protocol 11 gives direct access to the ECtHR to 
more than 800 million people that live in territories controlled by mem-
bers of the European Council, and increased the activity of the Court ex-
ponentially.244 Over 90% of the judgments of the Court’s first 50 years 
were delivered after the entry of Protocol 11 into force in 1998.245 In Sep-
tember 2008, the Court delivered its 10,000th judgment.246 Judgments 
touch on issues such as what constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, the definition of torture, the prohibition against non-
refoulement, the right to liberty and security of the person, and the right 
to property, as well as such personal issues as assisted suicide, the death 
penalty, in-vitro fertilization and the freedom to manifest one’s reli-
gion.247 
The Court’s success also clearly signals that, given the opportunity, 
individuals are willing and able to access international courts directly. In 
fact, individuals have shown time and time again their interest in bring-
ing their cases to the ECtHR where they ask for remedies unavailable to 
them in the domestic sphere.248 
The ECtHR is an extraordinary example and model, not only be-
cause it grants immediate access to individuals for their international law 
claims, but because the jurisdiction of the Court is based on effective 
control of territory, and not nationality. Indeed, Article 1 of the ECHR 
requires all Contracting Parties to secure “to everyone within their juris-
diction” the rights and freedoms enumerated in the Charter.249 Thus, the 
provision of rights is based on the control that the Contracting Parties 
 
243 H.E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President, Int’l Court of Justice, Speech at the 
Ceremony Marking the 50th Anniversary of the European Court of Human Rights: 
The International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights: 
Partners for the Protection of Human Rights (January 30, 2009) (President Higgins 
suggests “[t]he European Court of Human Rights is surely one of the busiest and 
most exemplary of international judicial bodies. It exerts a profound influence on the 
laws of social realities of its Member States and has become the paradigm for other 
regional human rights courts, not to mention other international judicial bodies in 
general.”).  
244 Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, The European Court of Human Rights, in THE 
RULES, PRACTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 324 (C. 
Giorgetti ed., 2012). 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 337–39. See also S.H. v. Austria, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. 
248 See, e.g., Apply to the Court, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://www.echr.coe.int/ 
Pages/home.aspx?p=applicants&c=#n 1357809352012_pointer (last visited August 25, 
2018) (the Court’s website contains a wealth of information demonstrating how to 
lodge an application). 
249 ECHR, supra note 75, art. 1. 
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enjoy over their territory, irrespective of the claimant’s nationality. This 
approach has been confirmed in practice repeatedly.   
Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom concerned the deaths of 
several of the applicants’ close relatives, which occurred in Basra, Iraq 
while it was under UK occupation.250 The principal issue in the case relat-
ed to whether the ECHR applied in regards to the killing of Iraqi nation-
als in Iraq by British troops, and thus whether the Iraqi relatives could go 
to the ECtHR to seek redress. The Court found that there was indeed a 
jurisdictional connection between the UK and the individuals killed in 
the course of British security operations, because the UK had assumed 
authority and responsibility for the maintenance of security in Basra dur-
ing that time. The Court thus found that the UK had violated the Con-
vention by not investigating the circumstances related to the deaths of 
the relatives of the claimants. Significantly, the Court found that the na-
tionality of the victims and claimants were not a necessary link for a find-
ing of jurisdiction.251 Contracting Parties to the ECHR are liable to up-
hold their obligations under the ECHR when they exercise public powers 
in the territory where the relative events occur. The relevant issue for ju-
risdiction is who has the power to provide the substantive right.  
These conclusions were confirmed in another similar, but not iden-
tical, situation. In Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy,252 the ECtHR found that 
Italy could be held accountable under Article 1 (obligation to respect 
human rights) of the Convention in a case brought by certain Somali and 
Eritrean migrants travelling from Libya and then repatriated to Libya by 
Italy. The Court found that even if the claimants had not touched Italian 
soil, the events at the center of the complaint had taken place entirely 
on-board Italian military ships. In the time between boarding the ships 
and being handed over to the Libyan authorities, the applicants “were 
under the continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control of the Ital-
ian authorities.”253 
 
250 Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, United Kingdom required 
to investigate deaths of six civilians killed in Iraq in 2003 in incidents involving British 
soldiers (July 7, 2011) (holding: “The case concerned the deaths of the applicants’ six 
close relatives in Basrah in 2003 while the UK was an occupying power…. An extra-
territorial act would fall within the State’s jurisdiction under the Convention only in 
exceptional circumstances. One such exception established in the Court’s case-law 
was when a State bound by the Convention exercised public powers on the territory 
of another State. . . . Since the applicants’ relatives were killed in the course of United 
Kingdom security operations during that period, the United Kingdom was required 
to carry out an investigation into their deaths.”). 
251 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 62. 
252 Jamaa v. Italy, 2012 Eur. Ct. H. R.1 (the case concerned Somali and Eritrean 
migrants travelling from Libya who had been intercepted at sea by the Italian 
authorities and sent back to Libya;. the events giving rise to the alleged violations fell 
within Italy’s jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention). 
253 Id. ¶ 81. 
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These cases are important for many reasons. First, they make clear 
that the proper test for jurisdiction is based on the control exercised by 
the Contracting Party over the relevant territory and situation. The na-
tionality of the claimants and victims is irrelevant, because their State of 
nationality is irrelevant for the analysis. What is relevant is which State 
has the power and obligation to grant the rights in question. The test is a 
functional one, based on control, where what matters “is not some ab-
stract or generalized test of personal or geographical control, but rather 
the specific power or authority assumed by the state”.254 The steps for 
identifying the claim brought under the ECHR plays out as follows: 
Whose human rights is the claim compensating? The individual’s. Who 
has the power to provide these human rights? The State that has control 
over the territory where the situation occurs. The purpose of the remedy 
is to compensate the individual for a violation of a specific human rights 
by a controlling authority to specific persons. The remedy is asked by the 
subject (the individual) who suffered the violation to the subject (the 
State) that should have provided the right.255 
A second fundamental and larger point is also interesting. The 
ECHR also demonstrates the willingness of States to agree to different 
bases of jurisdiction other than nationality. Often, the assumption is that 
States adopt nationality as a requirement of granting access to interna-
tional forums as part of their treaty negotiation process with other States, 
so that what they obtain for their nationals, they then offer to nationals of 
other States.256 But this does not need to be so. The jurisdiction of the 
ECtHR shows that States (some 47 of them in this case)257 are also willing 
to negotiate alternative ways of granting individuals access to interna-
tional remedies, which, in the ECHR case, is based on territorial control. 
This obligation ultimately covers not only nationals of any of the Con-
tracting Parties to the ECHR, but in reality covers an unknown number 
of people a Contracting Party may exercise control over. Articulated in 
this way, the jurisdictional provision of the ECtHR shows its uniqueness 
as an international remedy system. It also sheds light on the diverse 
methodologies that could be used to identify and resolve individuals’ 
claims under international law. 
 
254 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Growing Barriers: International Refugee Law, in 
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 73 (Mark Gibney & 
Sigrun Skogly eds., 2010) (defining functional jurisdiction and also stating that 
“[j]urisdiction in this sense flows from the de facto relationship established between 
an individual and a state through the very act itself”). 
255 Supra Part I(c) (nationality only plays a role when the international law 
system—negotiated by Treaties by States—imposes it as a requirement to access a 
forum. There is no logical need to include the nationality in the calculation).  
256 Supra Part I(c).  
257 47 Member States, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/47-
members-states (last visited August 25, 2018). 
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Indeed, an approach that is not based on nationality could be used 
for individual claims arising out of other areas of international law, pro-
vided these claims arise from rights of the individual and not of the State, 
the redress and remedy of which benefits the individual and not the 
State. In such cases, the link that permits access to specialized forums 
could be based on a nexus that is alternative to nationality.  
A new analysis would better serve the individual. The analysis would 
start by asking what is the de facto (factual) relationship established be-
tween an individual and a state, what or whom is the right trying to pro-
tect, who has the responsibility of providing the right, and the reason of 
the remedy sought. Let’s consider international economic rights as an 
example. One of the fundamental reasons for providing international 
economic rights is to protect foreign nationals and their capital when 
they invest substantial funds in a foreign country.258 In the bargaining 
process, one side brings foreign capital, and the receiving side offers 
guarantees of redress if rights linked to the investment are violated.259 It 
follows that the reason for providing the right is to protect the foreign 
investor. Providing compensation if a right is violated ensures that the 
equilibrium is maintained and—in the larger context—that the flow of 
foreign capital continues.260 The remedy exists because the individual is 
an alien (not because she has a certain nationality) acting in a foreign 
environment. The obligation of State X to compensate an investor Y for 
an illegal expropriation, for example, is not linked to the fact that the in-
vestor holds the nationality of State Y, but rather because she is an al-
ien—a non-X national—who has established a certain relationship with 
State Y and whose property was taken in violation of international law.261 
The right violated is a personal right of the individual, and the compen-
 
258 See ICSID Convention, supra note 227, at 160 (“Considering the need for 
international cooperation for economic development, and the role of private 
international investment therein; Bearing in mind the possibility that from time to 
time disputes may arise in connection with such investment between Contracting 
States and nationals of other Contracting States; Recognizing that while such disputes 
would usually be subject to national legal processes, international methods of 
settlement may be appropriate in certain cases; Attaching particular importance to 
the availability of facilities for international conciliation or arbitration to which 
Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting states may submit such disputes 
if they so desire; Desiring to establish such facilities under the auspices of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development”). 
259 Id.  
260 See Part A: Formulation of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of Other States, in 1 THE HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 
2, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/History%20of%20ICSID% 
20Convention%20-%20VOLUME%20I.pdf.  
261 Were she a national of State X, her remedies for a domestic violation would 
be found under domestic recourse. See, e.g., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION art. 1(3–4) (amended 2006) (UNITED 
NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 1985). 
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sation goes directly to the individual. Nationality does not have to play a 
role. It only does now because of the system we chose to build. 
Moving away from nationality as an identifier of claims would require 
rethinking the reasoning behind granting individual’s rights, and why we 
want to compensate the individual if a right is not respected. A functional 
analysis bases jurisdiction on the de facto relationship created between 
the individual and the state through the act itself.262 A similar analysis 
could provide an alternative basis for jurisdiction for other areas where 
the individual has acquired international rights.  
Undoubtedly, this move will go hand-in-hand with the rethinking of 
subjects in international law, which doctrinally has already shown to be 
more receptive to reconsidering the role of individuals.263 It will most 
likely result in placing the individual in a stronger position as a subject in 
international law, often detached from the State of nationality. This 
should not be seen as problematic. Attaching international remedies to 
nationality is not logically necessary. As Higgins said, the intellectual 
prison related to the doctrine of subjects is entirely our own making.264 It 
is time for us to no longer consider it unalterable.265 
2. Multiple Bases for Jurisdiction 
An additional technique to free the individual from the nationality 
requirement for international claims is to provide alternative bases to ex-
ercise jurisdiction.  
We find, again, one useful example in practice. As explored in Sec-
tion I above, international criminal law provides for the parallel acquisi-
tion of individual international obligations and their enforceability on 
the international plane.266 Specifically, under the Rome Treaty that estab-
lished the International Criminal Court (ICC), jurisdiction over individ-
uals for violations of international criminal law come from a variety of 
sources. At the ICC, jurisdiction may be based on nationality, territoriali-
ty, or can be given by Security Council resolution.267 Article 12(2) of ICC 
Statute provides the conditions to the exercise of jurisdiction, and name-
ly: 
If one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute 
or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance 
with paragraph 3: 
i. The State on the territory of which the conduct in ques-
tion occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a 
 
262 Gammeltoft-Hansen, supra note 254, at 73. 
263 See supra Part I(a). 
264 HIGGINS, supra note 60, at 49. 
265 Id. 
266 See supra Part I(c). 
267 Rome Statute, supra note 115, art. 12. 
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vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel 
or aircraft; 
ii. The State of which the person accused of the crime is a 
national.268 
Additionally, jurisdiction over a specific case can be acquired through a 
Resolution of the Security Council if “[a] situation in which one or more 
. . . crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor 
by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations . . . .”269  
Truly, the jurisdictional provisions of the ICC are unique in scope 
and reach. Several issues are relevant and example-setting. First, the ICC 
provides multiple alternative modes of jurisdiction. An individual can fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Court because she is a national of a con-
tracting State or because her conduct occurred in a space (territory, ves-
sel or aircraft) controlled by a contracting State. This is in the alternative; 
it is not a cumulative test. The guiding idea is to facilitate jurisdiction as 
much as possible. If jurisdiction cannot be found under one principle, it 
could be established under an alternative method. 
Moreover, similarly to the ECtHR provisions analyzed above, the ju-
risdiction of the ICC includes alternatives to nationality. Indeed, the first 
jurisdictional mechanism cited in the Statute is based on territoriality, 
not nationality. Jurisdiction can be based on where the relevant conduct 
occurred. This is important because it detaches jurisdiction from nation-
ality—which is desirable for the reasons already stated270—and because it 
provides alternative bases for jurisdiction. 
The ICC approach is also appealing because it introduces a jurisdic-
tional mechanism that is completely detached from the relationship be-
tween the State and the individual, and instead relies on an action from a 
body external to that relation. In the ICC, jurisdiction can be found 
through mandates from the Security Council to the Prosecutor. A similar 
approach could be imagined for other relations also, where the mandate 
bestowing jurisdiction could come from an actor who is external to the 
 
268 Id. (note also that under ¶ 3 of the same provision, non-signatory can also 
accept the competence of the Court for a specific case. “If the acceptance of a State 
which is not a Party to this Statute is required under paragraph 2, that State may, by 
declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court 
with respect to the crime in question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the 
Court without any delay or exception . . . .”). 
269 Id. art. 13(b) (stating that “The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect 
to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute 
if . . . (b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been 
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations . . . .”). 
270 See supra Part I(c). 
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relationship between the State and the individual, but still capable and 
relevant in creating a jurisdictional link.  
The ICC has an extraordinary link to the Security Council. Yet the 
ICC is not the only international adjudicative body that has a relationship 
with the Security Council. The ICTY and ICTR, two of the main interna-
tional criminal tribunals that predate the ICC, were created by Security 
Council resolutions.271 The Security Council also created the United Na-
tions Claims Commission (UNCC), a commission tasked with compensat-
ing individuals, States, and companies for injuries suffered as a conse-
quence of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.272 The Security Council 
maintained its link with the UNCC throughout the existence of the 
Commission. In fact, the Governing Body of the UNCC—the principal 
organ responsible for the general policy and legal framework of the 
Commission—mirrored the composition of the Security Council.273  
An approach based on multiple bases for jurisdiction would be a 
welcomed development in other areas of international law. Take, for ex-
ample, individual claims arising from violations of humanitarian law. In a 
situation in which an individual seeks redress for an international crimi-
nal law violation, jurisdiction could be attached in several alternative 
ways. For example, in the event of an international conflict between 
States A and B, Individual A could claim compensation as a victim of 
State B’s crimes because the crime was committed in territory of State A 
by troops of State B, or because the crime was committed against Indi-
vidual A as a national of State A, or because the Security Council deter-
mined that the situation was of such a nature as to deserve international 
redress and compensation. Creating diverse jurisdictional links would 
give individuals multiple ways to bring a claim to an international venue; 
it would also recognize and acknowledge the complexities and unique-
ness of creating a new system of relationships between individuals and 
other actors in international law. 
 
271 See supra Part I(c) at notes 100–01. 
272 S.C. Res. 687 (Apr. 3, 1991) (the jurisdiction of the UNCC included claims for 
individuals who were forced to leave Iraq or Kuwait as a result of the invasion, 
individual claims for serious personal injury or death, claims for individual losses, 
claims by corporations and other private or public enterprises, claims from 
governments in the region (including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syrian, Jordan and Kuwait) 
and international organizations. Overall, about 2.7 million claims were filed, and as 
of 2005, the year in which it concluded its work, the UNCC has paid $47.8 billion in 
compensation). See also BRILMAYER ET. AL., supra note 143, at 18–19; WAR REPARATIONS 
AND THE UN COMPENSATION COMMISSION: DESIGNING COMPENSATION AFTER CONFLICT 
xxxi (Timothy J. Feighery et al. eds., 2015). See generally Timothy J. Feighery, The 
United Nations Compensation Commission, in THE RULES, PRACTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 515–35 (C. Giorgetti, ed. 2012). 
273 See generally Governing Council, UNCC: UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION 
COMMISSION, https://uncc.ch/governing-council (last visited Aug. 26, 2018). 
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The UNCC also provides an interesting perspective on this issue. In 
fact, the jurisdiction of the UNCC over individuals’ claims was based on a 
unique phrasing of the nationality requirement. In its first session, the 
UNCC Governing Council decided that “[c]laims will not be considered 
on behalf of Iraqi nationals who do not have bona fide nationality of any 
other State.”274 Under the UNCC procedural rules, therefore, Iraqi na-
tionals were allowed to file claims if they possessed a bona fide nationality 
of any other State. This opened up the UNCC to dual-nationals also. Fur-
ther, acknowledging the difficulties of providing compensation based on-
ly on links to nationality, especially in the aftermath of the chaotic situa-
tion created by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the UNCC rules provided that 
“[a]n appropriate person, authority, or body appointed by the Governing 
Council may submit claims on behalf of persons who are not in a position 
to have their claims submitted by a Government.” 275 
In sum, there are mechanisms that would address the procedural 
deficits that now blocks the individual’s access to international remedies. 
These are based on single or multiple bases for jurisdiction that could re-
ly on control, location of the events, external factors, and even nationali-
ty as a possible alternative. The section below explores how these mecha-
nisms can be useful in practice. 
B. Why it Would Be Good—Two Examples 
Rejecting nationality as a requirement for individuals to access inter-
national remedies also allows for and facilitates addressing important 
contemporary challenges.276 Two examples are considered below, namely 
claims arising from climate change, and investment claims by a perma-
nent tribunal. 
1. Compensation for Damages Caused by the Effects of Climate Change 
The recently concluded Paris Agreement—part of a larger interna-
tional effort to address climate change277—includes language that recog-
 
274 U.N. Comp. Comm’n, Criteria for the Expedited Processing of Urgent Claims, 
U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/1, ¶ 17 (August 2, 1991) (“Claims will not be considered 
on behalf of Iraqi nationals who do not have bona fide nationality of any other 
State.”).  
275 U.N. Comp. Comm’n, Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, U.N. Doc. 
S/AC.26/1992/10 at 5 (June 26, 1992). 
276 In addition to the two scenarios briefly outlined above, see supra Part II(a). 
277 Find Out More About COP21, COP21PARIS.ORG, http://www.cop21paris.org/ 
about/cop21/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2018) (the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) entered into force in 1994, with near 
universal participation of 196 parties. The parties to the UNFCCC meet annually for a 
Conference of the Parties (COP)). 
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nizes the need for “addressing loss and damage associated with the ad-
verse effects of climate change.”278  
The specific mechanisms for future monetary compensation are 
surely complex and beyond the scope of the Article.279 However, at the 
outset, it is valuable to note that a compensation mechanism for climate 
change injuries would be a perfect candidate to implement a model 
based on alternatives to the individual’s nationality. 
The consequences of climate change are increasingly visible.280 Ris-
ing sea level, coastal erosion and flooding, ocean acidification and coral 
bleaching are just some of the ways in which climate change impact the 
ocean. Climate change also impacts freshwater resources, and can 
change weather patterns, produce more intense precipitation, flooding, 
drought and heat-waves. At the poles, ice melting and permafrost thaw-
ing are also attributable to climate change.281 The economic costs of cli-
mate change are expected to be considerable.282  
There are periodic proposals on how to compensate victims of cli-
mate change, for example, those who lose their homes or livelihoods to 
rising water levels, floods, or changed weather patterns.283 Compensating 
climate change damages is challenging because climate change is caused 
by the accumulation of man-made greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
over time and from many diverse sources. Moreover, the effects of cli-
mate change are not usually felt in proximity to the sources of the gases, 
but in distant locations. People in developing countries living in low-
elevation lands are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate 
change.284 Attributing responsibility and compensating damages from 
climate change is therefore particularly difficult.  
For these reasons, an approach that relies on diverse bases of juris-
diction will be particularly adept to climate change compensation. Bases 
for jurisdiction could include the location of damage—for example in 
 
278 Paris Agreement, art. 8, Dec. 12, 2015 (in Paris, parties agreed to continue the 
Warsaw Agreement, which was established by the UNFCCC (2013), Decision 2/CP.19 
in 2013. Specifically, under Art. 8 Parties agreed to “recognize the importance of 
averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse 
effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, 
and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage”). 
279 For a proposal to use claims commissions to address the issue, see BRILMAYER 
ET. AL., supra note 143, at 226–31. 
280 See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: 
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability—Summary for Policymakers (2014), http://trade. 
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf [hereinafter 2014 
Summary for Policy Makers on Impacts]. 
281 Id. at 32.  
282 Id. at 19. 
283 Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1605, 1633–34 (2006). 
284 2014 Summary for Policy Makers on Impacts, supra note 280, at 13.  
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cases of floods. If relocation of a certain population is needed, the na-
tionality or location of the residency of the people to be moved could al-
so serve as bases for jurisdiction. If the injury pertains to the loss of a spe-
cific source of livelihood—for example loss of fishing availability because 
of changing weather patterns—the link to the compensation could be 
based on a demonstrable loss of livelihood. 
By choosing an alternative to nationality to establish a link to the in-
jury an individual has suffered under international law, the injured per-
son would enjoy additional ways to present her claims. Additionally, cre-
ating multiple bases of jurisdiction also increase the likelihood that the 
entire group of people that deserve compensation is reached. 
As explained above, this change does not need to be difficult. Ra-
ther, it signals a new appreciation and understanding of the role of the 
individual in international law, which is in line with the doctrinal appre-
ciation of the increasingly relevant role of the individual. 
In addition to climate change-related claims, an approach based on 
multiple bases for jurisdiction could also be helpful to compensate other 
claims that originate from diffuse violations and claims arising from ac-
tions by many international actors, such as other environmental claims. 
2. Investment Claims by a Permanent Tribunal 
A second example to appreciate the usefulness of severing nationali-
ty as a link to international claims builds on the recent proposal to create 
a permanent tribunal to hear claims arising out of international invest-
ment within the European Union (EU).285 
International investment arbitration is a system established to hear 
claims by individual investors against host States for claims based on na-
tionality and arising from violations of Investment Treaties.286 Interna-
tional investment arbitration enjoys increasing success from users. How-
ever, the system of international investment arbitration as presently 
constituted has also come under attack. Critics argue that a system based 
on the parties’ selection of arbitrators is inherently suspicious.287 They al-
 
285 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and U.S. 
(TTIP) ch. II, EUR. COMM’N ON TRADE (Nov. 12, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa. 
eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf (the TTIP negotiations are now 
suspended, but similar provisions are included in other recent EU investment 
treaties).  
286 Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/ 
investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds (last visited Aug. 27, 2018). 
287 Alexis Mourre, Are Unilateral Appointments Defensible? On Jan Paulsson’s Moral 
Hazard in International Arbitration, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Oct. 5, 2010), http:// 
kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/10/05/are-unilateralappointments-
defensible-on-jan-paulsson%E2%80%99s-moral-hazard-ininternational-arbitration. 
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so claim that international investment arbitration lacks transparency and 
may be too inclined to rule in favor of investors and against States.288 
To address these concerns, alternatives to investment arbitration 
have been proposed. Specifically, the EU proposed to create a perma-
nent international court for investment, with permanent judges, to hear 
all claims arising from treaties with the EU.289 This also goes hand in 
hand with the current trend to negotiate multilateral, rather than bilat-
eral, investment treaties.290 Indeed, separating individual claims from na-
tionality requirements may also contribute to the rethinking of bilateral 
treaties that are focused on investment, so that the new generation of 
treaties may be focused on foreign investment in a multilateral setting, 
providing rights to all foreign individuals that seek to invest per se, rather 
than because of their country of origin. 
As we elaborate on the creation of a new system to provide redress to 
individuals for their international claims, the issue of how to link the 
claim to the individual can also be reconsidered. Claims based on na-
tionality could be altered so that individual claims are based on a charac-
teristic of the individual not linked to her State of nationality, but to a 
different identifier linked to her as an investor. 
Specifically, a functional test, based on control and on the specific 
power and authority that the State receiving the investment assumes vis-à-
vis the individual, would work better in this instance.291 This rethinking 
will acknowledge the fact that compensation is given because the State 
has failed to uphold an obligation it owed to an individual from another 
State. The relationship between the individual and the State responsible 
 
288 See, e.g., Anthony DePalma, NAFTA’s Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle 
Disputes, but Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, ¶ 1 (stating, in 
reference to NAFTA arbitration, that “[their] meetings are secret. Their members are 
generally unknown. The decisions they reach need not be fully disclosed.”). See also 
Behind Closed Doors: A Hard Struggle to Shed Some Light on a Legal Grey Area, ECONOMIST 
(Apr. 23, 2009), https://www.economist.com/international/2009/04/23/behind-
closed-doors (reviewing the issue of transparency and secrecy in international 
arbitration and assessing calls for increased transparency). 
289 Multilateral Investment Court: Council Gives Mandate to the Commission to Open 
Negotiations, EUROPEAN COUNCIL (Mar. 20, 2018), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
en/press/press-releases/2018/03/20/multilateral-investment-court-council-gives-
mandate-to-the-commission-to-open-negotiations/. 
290  See generally International Energy Charter Consolidated Energy Charter Treaty (Jan. 
15, 2016), http://www.energycharter.org/process/energy-charter-treaty-1994/energy-
charter-treaty. See also Is a Multilateral Investment Treaty Needed?, WORLD TRADE 
INSTITUTE (June 19, 2017), https://www.wti.org/media/filer_public/b9/f9/b9f94071-
2dac-47ae-b840-ca6abaf09e3f/investment_conference_19_june_2017.pdf (demonstrating 
recent discussion about the topic of multilateral investment treaties at a 2017 World 
Economic Forum Conference). 
291 Gammeltoft-Hansen, supra note 254, at 73 (defining functional jurisdiction 
and also stating that “[j]urisdiction in this sense flows from the de facto relationship 
established between an individual and a state through the very act itself”). 
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to provide the right matters. But the specific origin of the individual is 
not relevant, especially if the claim is based on multilateral treaties. This 
approach will also facilitate the identification of the claimant, and will 
sidestep the risk of an incorrect analysis of the nationality requirements 
by Tribunals. 
Embracing a system that recognizes the claims of the individual 
based on functional test and not on nationality will provide significant 
procedural rights to the individual and will be an essential development 
toward the recognition of the changing role the individual plays in inter-
national law. 
CONCLUSION 
International law has displayed a schizophrenic attitude towards na-
tionality. On one side, it is at the center of an individual’s international 
recognition. On the other, international courts and tribunals ultimately 
decide whether a claim of protection based on nationality should be sup-
ported or not. 
This Article suggests that, as the position of the individual evolves in 
international law, alternatives to nationality are used as bases of jurisdic-
tion. This approach will provide a more expansive standing and redress 
of individuals for claims under international law. It will also be particular-
ly helpful for claims by stateless people and dual nationals. 
This Article does not suggest eliminating nationality completely. In 
today’s international legal system, nationality, and thus a connection to a 
State, is still important for many reasons for the individuals, for example 
for the ability to travel. What it does suggest, however, is that when inter-
national claims belong to the individual, the individual should be able to 
exercise them fully. The discrepancy that exists between the recognition 
of the individual as a holder of international rights and the lack of pro-
cedural rights would be reduced, and the position of the individual will 
be enhanced by severing the link to nationality for international individ-
uals’ claims. 
International law is still essentially state centric. States negotiate trea-
ties, form custom, create international organizations and make up the 
members of the Security Council. Embracing a new system to provide in-
ternational procedural rights to individuals detached from nationality 
will also be an important step to acknowledge and support the increas-
ingly relevant role of the individual in international law. 
 
 
